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Chapter One
1.1 Introduction
One of the key pieces oflegislation that emerged subsequent to the democratisation of
South Africa in 1994 was the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (LRA). The LRA was
passed in Parliament on 13th September 1995 after more than one year of drafting,
negotiation among South Africa's social partners, and mass economic and political
action by unions. 1 The LRA, among other things, guarantees all South African
employees, with the exception of employees working for agencies dealing with
national security, protection against unfair dismissal. In line with the aforegoing, the
LRA has created new democratic institutions, the purpose of which is to resolve
disputes that emerge from the labour arena. One such institution is the Commission
for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA), which is independent of the
state, any political party, trade union, employer, employers' organisation, and
federation of trade unions or federation of employers' organisation. '
The CCMA plays a central role in the statutory dispute-resolution process . All
disputes not handled by private procedures or accredited bargaining councils or
agencies must be referred to it for conciliation or mediation before they can be
referred to arbitration or adjudication. ' Parties that make use of this statutory form of
dispute resolution, have the right to have the decisions or awards of the CCMA
commissioners reviewed by the labour courts, albeit on limited grounds prescribed by
the LRA. The grounds for review or defects upon which an award may be reviewed
are briefly that: the commissioner committed misconduct in relation to the duties of
the commissioner as an arbitrator; he committed a gross irregularity in the conduct of
the arbitration proceedings; he exceeded his powers and that the award was
improperly obtained. 4 It is these grounds for review, as they are often raised from time
to time by aggrieved parties, that will constitute the subject of investigation in this
1 C.W.Sharpe 'Reviewing CCMA Arbitration Awards: Towards clarity in the labour court'
(2000) 21 ILJ 2160
2 S 112 and 113
3 J Grogan Workplace Law 6 ed (2001) 301
4 S 145
work. The aim is to investigate how commissioners' awards have fared in the light of
these reviews, as well as the extent to which the review function has impacted on the
tasks of the commissioners through its judgements. To achieve the aforegoing, the
study will among other things investigate whether or not the labour courts have
adhered to the principles of a review and hence maintained the distinction that exists
between these principles and those of appeal. One will further find out whether or not
the review function has been consistent in its rulings, an area that may cause
confusion in the activities of the CCMA if it is lacking. In the overall, the study seeks
to find out if the actions of both the arbitration and adjudication function have
contributed positively towards the achievement of the objectives set out in the LRA,
one of which is the speedy and effective resolution oflabour disputes, a thing that was
a far cry in the old systern .'
While this chapter introduces the subject of this study, the second chapter will focus
on understanding the basis for the choice of a review in the new legislation over an
appeal. In the chapter, one will further see the motivations for preferring a review to
an appeal. A brief discussion will be made on the early debates regarding the
appropriate section of the LRA that enables parties to take the awards on review. This
is where the distinction between the two concepts will be addressed.
The third chapter will focus on the grounds for review as prescribed in section 145 of
the LRA. The objective will be to see how the commissioners' awards have fared in
the light of these defects, and the extent to which the principles of review have been
adhered to in the process of reviewing these awards. Additionally, the study will
touch on the test for review brought about by the Labour Appeal Court in the decision
of Carephone v Marcus No and others.6 The test is that commissioners' awards
should be rationally justifiable in terms of the reasons given for them . Lastly, chapter
four will critically evaluate the review function with the view to seeing how its
activities have impacted on the arbitration function. Among other things, the issue of
consistency in its jurisprudence will be dealt with. The study will draw conclusions
from these investigations in chapter five .
5 See s 1(d)(iv)
6(1998) 191LJ 1425 (LAC)
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Chapter Two
2.1 Understanding the basis for review
2.2 Introduction
One of the key objectives of the Labour Relations Act No 66 Of 1995 (LRA) is the
' effective resolu tion of labour disputes.,7 The LRA seeks to achieve this by promoting
voluntary and orderly collective bargaining between labour and management with a
view to their reaching collective agreements that will assist in the resolution of their
diffe rences. 8 Notwithstanding the aforegoing, the LRA further acknowledges that no
system of collective bargaining can be perfect as to resolve all disputes. It is on the
basis of this that the LRA has prescribed methods and procedures to resolve disputes
and hence reduce the incidenc e of resorting to industrial warfare.9
Unlike in the previous dispensation where employers and employees were free to
engage in industrial action in regard to any matter not covered by an agreement or
determination, provided that it concemed the employment relat ionship.l'' the current
LRA has distinguished between methods and procedures for resolving rights and
interest disputes. Dispute s of interests may be resolved through industrial action while
rights disputes are resolved by arbitration or adjudication. Arbitration in terms of the
LRA, is performed by the Commission for Conciliation Medi ation and Arbitration
(CCMA) 1I whilst the Labour Courts'< have jurisdiction over disputes arising from the
same Act. Unlike in interests disputes where awards prior to industrial action are
purely advisory, awards in respect of rights disputes are intended to be final and
binding. r' This was intended to enhance expeditious resolution of disputes, which is
7 See s 1(d)(iv)
8 J . Grogan (note 3 above) 300
9 1bid 300
10 Ibid 300
11 See s 136
12 See s 157
13 S 143(1) states that an arbitration award issued by a commissioner is final and binding and
may be made an order of the Labour Court in terms of s 158(1)©, unless it is an advisory
award.
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one of the primary objects of the LRA. There is therefore no right of appeal against
these awards. Instead the aggrieved party may apply for review of the award in the
Labour Court on certain limited grounds.
Since the promulgation of the current law, there has been on-going debates relating to
this review function. For instance, those in favour of an appeal are of the opinion that
a review is restrictive, especially where arbitration is compulsory. There has further
been debates as to which of the sections, s 145 and/or 158, is applicable when one
considers an award on review. The Labour Courts, charged with the review function,
have made several pronouncements with regards to these competing sections for
purposes of certainty and stability in the resolution of disputes. It has in the process
laid down review tests that have resulted in a blurring of the line between appeal and
review, prompting a call for legislative intervention to restore certainty in this area of
the law. The purpose of this chapter is to explore the aforegoing developments with
the view to finding the impact they have had on the review process as well as the
policy considerations that underpinned the choice of a review over that of appeal.
2.3 Review vs Appeal
When the present LRA was drafted, many of the changes introduced were meant to
address the shortcomings experienced in the previous system. In the Explanatory
Memorandum that accompanied the new LRA, the perceived shortcomings of the
previous system were summarised as follows":
Existing statutory conciliation procedures are lengthy, complex and pitted
with technicalities. Successful navigation through the procedures requires a
sophistication and expertise beyond the reach of most individuals and small
business ....The absence of procedures for the independent and effective
mediation of disputes means that many resolvable disputes culminate in
industrial action.
14
Explanatory Memorandum to the draft Labour Relations Bill, 1995 Ministerial Task Team,
Dept of Labour (1995) 16 ILJ 308
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To address these shortcomings, a system of compulsory arbitration was introduced for
the determination of disputes and the awards emanating from the same were to be
final and binding in order to achieve a simple , quick, cheap and non-legalistic
approach to the resolution of disputes. It was evident that unless a credible, legitimate
alternative process was provided for determining unfair dismissal disputes, workers
were likely to resort to industrial action in response to dismi ssal. ls In order to
facilitate swift disputes resolution, final and binding awards were not to be appealed
against but rather reviewed. In the instance of a review, the reviewing body is limited
to a consideration of the conduct of the process and that of the arbitrator, and legality
or validity of the decision under examination.16 New evidence may be led, if this is
necessary to determine the existence of illegalities.17 It must however be noted that in
the context of the LRA, there are prescribed grounds upon which a review action may
be brought before the court.18 An appeal on the other hand generally involves a
reconsideration of the merits of a dispute, but the re-hearing is often limited to the
evidence on which the decision under the appeal was given. i" Howe ver appeals can
also involve a complete re-hearing of the case and thereafter a new determination on
the merits. i" The above difference has been noted in the case law that has emerged
from our courts. For instance in Coetzee v Lebea No and anothe/lthe court as per
Cheadle AJ made the following distin ction:
A review concerns itself with the manner in which the tribunal comes to its
conclusion rather than with its result. An appeal, on the other hand, is
concerned with the correctness ofthe result.
The reasons motivating the choice of a review are articulated in the memorandum and
are summarised as follows:
15 1bid 309
16 L Baxter Administrative Law (1991) 256
17 Baxter (note 16 above) 256
18 See s 145
19 John Brand et al Labour Dispute Resolution (1997) 204
20 Ibid 204
21 (1999) 20 ILJ 129 (Le)
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The absence of an appeal from the arbitrators award speeds up the process
and f rees it from the legalism that accompanies appeal proceedings. It is
tempting to provide fo r appeals because dismissal is a very serious matter,
particularly given the lack of prospects of alternative employment in the
present economic climate. However this temptation must be resisted as
appeals tend to records, lengthy proceedings, lawyers, legalism, inordinate
delays and high costs. Appeals have a negative impact on reinstatement as a
remedy, they undermine the basic purpose ofthe legislation and they make the
system too expensive f or individuals and small business.
However the above VIews III favour of a review have not gone unchallenged.
Proponents of this process argue that it ought to be there considering that the parti es
are compelled into a process and above all an arbitrator is forced upon them. 22 It is
admitted by the same critics however that the deprivation of the right of appeal is
perfectly in order where the parties deliberately and voluntarily contract out of formal
litigation and choose private arbitration. In their view, without some kind of appeal, it
is very difficult to eliminate the inconsistency in CCMA procedure and
jurisprudence." It is however not enti rely true that arbitrators are forced upon parties
as any or both parties may object to the appointment of a commissioner as an
arbitrator' ". It is however admissible that there is some element of compulsion in the
whole process as parti es have no choice but to go through the CCMA or whatever
procedures are prescribed by the LRA if they do not have private arrangements for the
resolution of disputes .
Although there is no right of appeal, the way the courts have gone about setting tests
for the review of awards has resulted in questions being asked as to whether there still
22 J. Brand. 'CCMA: Achievements and Challenges - Lessons from the first three years'
(2000) 21 ILJ 77 ,90
23 Ibid 90
24 S 136(3) states: Any party to the dispute , who wants to object to the arbitration also being
conducted by the commiss ioner who attempted to resolve the dispute through conciliation,
may do so by filing an objection in that regard with the commission within seven days after the
date on which the commissioner's certificate was issued, and must satisfy the commission
that a copy of the objection has been served on all the other parties to the dispute.
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exists a distinction between a review and an appeal as applied by the Labour Court.
The scope of review has been extended by the court to a point where the merits of the
dispute are considered, with the court arguing that this is appropriate as long as it does
not replace the decision of the arbitrator with its own findings . The disturbing
tendency with which the scope of review is rapidly widening flouts the important
underlying policy considerations for choosing a review as opposed to an appeal and
this has not gone unnoticed. Froneman DJP in Carephone issued the following
caution at page l435E of the judgement:
One must be careful not to exceed the scope of review f or the wrong reasons.
One such wrong reason would be the fa ct that the labour court has no original
or appeal j urisdiction in respect of the matters specified to be conciliated and
arbitrated under the auspices ofthe commission and to compensate for this by
an extended review.
It must be said that the erosion of the review in the context of what was initially
intended by the legislation threaten s to revert the current system to the shortcomings
of the past system.
2.4 Review of CCMA arbitration awards - Section 145 or 158?
As referred to above, the Labour Court does not lightly substitute its views for that of
a commissioner on such subjective issues as whether a dismissal was appropriate for a
particular offence except in the case of the most flagrant errors of judgement." For
that is the essence of a review . Flowing from the absence of the right of appeal, much
has been said and debated on the testes) which the labour courts have developed for
reviewing arbitration awards with reference to the reasoning of the commissioner
concerned.i'' It must be said that during the initial stage, the debate focused on the
appropriate provision of the LRA in terms of which reviews must be brought before
25 J Grogan (note 3 above) 306.
26 Ingrid de villiers 'Behind Closed Doors: Reviewing the conduct of CCMA Com missioners'
(2001) 10 eLL 71,71
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the labour court.27 Those who favoured a wide review test typically argued in favour
of the application of section 158(1)(g) of the LRA. The said section is entitled
'Powers of labour court' and states that ' the labour court may despite section 145,
review the performance or purported performance of any function provided for in the
act or omission for any person or body in terms of this act on any grounds that are
permissible by law.' Those who tended to prefer a strict review test favoured the
application of section 145 of the LRA. The said section entitled 'Review ofarbitration
awards' states that any party to a dispute who alleges a defect in any arbitraton
proceedings under the auspices of the commission may apply to the labour court for
an order setting aside the arbitration award and that the defect referred to in the
aforegoing means that the commissioner: (i) committed misconduct in relation to the
duties of the commissioner as an arbitrator; (ii) committed a gross irregularity in the
conduct of the arbitration proceedings; or (iii) exceeded the commissioner's powers;
or (b) that an ward has been improperly obtained.
Whether or not arbitration awards are reviewable by the labour courts in terms of
section 145 or the general provisions of section 158(1)(g) has been a subject of many
contradicting judgements. The uncertainty reigning in this area was somewhat laid to
rest in Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus No and others.28 There is however a
considerable amount of criticism levelled at this decision and this shall be reverted to
at a later stage. In the aforegoing decision, the labour court decided that the
appropriate section for reviewing awards was section 145 of the LRA and not section
158(1)(g). It was submitted that section 145 applies to the review of awards made by
commissioners of the CCMA whereas section 158(1)(g) applies to administrative
action taken by the state as an employer. The LAC made the following remarks with
respect to the confusion in the interpretation of these sections:
By virtue of its judicial authority and specific provisions of the LRA it may
review the exercise offunctions by the commission. Where a commissioner
exceeds the constitutional constraints on his or her powers on arbitration, this
27 PAK.Le Roux 'The Test for review of CCMA commissioners: some certainty at last' (2001)
10 CLL 117,118
28 Note 6 above, 1431
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can be reviewed by the labour court under section 145, in particular
s145(2)(a)(iii). It is not necessary to resort to s 158(l )(g) to achieve this end.
In finding that s 145 was the appropriate medium of review, the court had to contend
with several opposing views in favour of s 158(1)(g). One view was that the
provisions of s 145, which provides for specified limited grounds for reviewing the
CCMA's arbitration awards, violate the constitution. This argument was based on the
grounds specified in s 145 being narrower than those provided for by s 33(1)29 read
with item 23(2)(b) 30 of the constitution - particularly in that the constitutional
imperative that the commissioner's decision be justifiable in relation to the reasons
given for it is not clearly a ground for review in terms of s 145. Froneman DJP
however held that the view that s 145 should be interpreted narrowly stems from
inappropriate reliance placed on decisions interpreting a corresponding section of the
Arbitration Act 42 of 196531, notably the decision in the case of Amalgamated
29 Section 33(1) states that 'Everyone has the right to administrative action that is lawful,
reasonable and procedurally fair '
30 Item 23(2)(b) of the Constitution states that;
(2) until the legislation envisaged in section 32(2) and 33(3) of the new constitution is
enacted -
(b) section 33(1) and (2) must be regarded as follows :
'Every person has the right to -
(a) lawful administrative action where any of their rights or interests is affected or
threatened ;
(b) procedura lly fair administrative action where any of their rights or legitimate
expectations is affected or threatened
(c) be furnished with reasons in writing for administrative action which affects any of
their rights or interests unless the reasons for that action have been made public;
and
(d) administra tive action which is justifiable in relation to the reasons given for it
where any of their rights is affected or threatened
31 The corresponding section of the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965 is section 33 entitled 'Setting
aside of award ' which states;
(1) Where
(a) any member of an arbitration tribunal has misconducted himself in
relation to his duties as arbitrator or umpire; or
9
Clothing and Textil e Workers Union v Veldspan Ltd.
32
He held that the Arbitration
Act's operation in respect of arbitration under the auspices of the commission is
expressly excluded in the LRA (S 146); it applie s to private, consensual arbitration (
in contrast to the compulsory arbitration under the LRA); and its provisions were
assessed and interpreted in a different const itutional context. The Honourable
Froneman DJP further attributed the confusion to the way section 158(1)(g) IS
worded. In respect of the aforegoing he made the following remarks at 1434BCD:
It must be admitted that the choice of the word 'despite' in s 158(1)(g) is an
unhappy one. It allows for an interpretation of s 158(1)(g) as granting a
general review power to the Labour Court over any function, act or omission
under the LRA, instead ofits providing merely fo r the court's residual powers
of review fo r administrative fun ctions not defined spec ifically in ss 145 and
158(1)(h). If the latter interpretation is accepted, the provisions of ss 145,
158(1)(g) and 158(1)(h) apply to distinct and different fo rms of administrative
action and do not overlap. If, however, the fo rmer interpretation is accepted,
the field ofapplication of ss 145 and 158(1)(h) do overlap, with the result that
the provisions of s 145 become superfl uous.
It suffices to state finally that the court as per Froneman DJP came to the finding that
commissioner' s arbitration duties are administrative in nature and hence subject to the
imperatives set out in section 33 of the constitution, of fair administrative action. It
was in this context that the decision of a commissioner should be justifiable in relation
to the reasons given for it. This finding came under criticism in Shoprite Checkers
(Pty) Ltd v Ramdaw No and otherst" In this case Walli s AJ, basing his argument on
the decision of the Constitutional Court in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association
(b) an arbitration tribunal has committed any gross irregular ity in the conduct
of the arbitration proceedings or has exceeded his powers ; or
(c) an award has been improperly obtained , the court may, on the
application of any party to the reference after due notice to the other
party or parties, make an order setting the award aside
32 (1993) 14 ILJ 1431 (A)
33 (2000) 21 ILJ 1232 (Le)
10
ofSA; in re: Ex parte application ofthe president ofthe RSA and others
34
came to the
conclusion that a commissioner does not perform an administrative function and
therefore the principles of fair administrative action did not apply.35 In yet another
decision by the same court, in Toyota SA Motors (Pty) Ltd v Radebe and others,36 it
was held as per Nicholson lA that the court had inappropriately forced a rationality
review into section 145. The decision in Shoprite was taken on appeal and the LAC
addressed the issue of the appropriate review test in detail and came to the conclusion
that the Carephone decision and the test formulated therein still applied. It is common
cause that the test in Carephone was that of justifiability whereas the one in
Pharmaceutical was that of rationality. The court found that although the two terms
were not strictly speaking synonymous, they have sufficiently similar meaning to
justify the conclusion that rationality can be said to be accommodated within the
concept of justifiability as espoused in the Carephone decisionr"
Thus contrary to the ruling of the Labour Court in Shoprite, the Carephone decision
remains good law. The implication is that reviews of arbitration decisions are to be
brought before the courts through section 145 of the LRA which consists of a time
frame within which such action should be undertaken. Furthermore, it is clear from
the judgement that the merits and substance of the decision of the commissioners are
also subject to review which goes beyond mere consideration of procedural
irregularitiesr" It however remains questionable as to just how wide the rationality
test should be and how it is to be applied. One thing however that seems to emerge
out of this tussle of tests is the difficulty to distinguish between a review and an
appeal. As observed by Mischke,39 at first glance, this review of the logical cogency
of the decision-making process appears dangerously close to appeal, but the Labour
Appeal Court is at pains to point out that the difference between review and appeal
can be maintained.
34 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC)
35 le Roux (note 27 above) 119
36 (2000) 21 ILJ 340 (LAC)
37 le Roux (note 27 above) 120





3.1 Analysis of cases taken on review
3.2 Introduction
It has already been observed in the previous chapter that the choice for a review as
opposed to that of appeal in arbitration awards/proceedings was intended to give
finality to the disputes and hence achieve speedy resolution of the same. Further
discussion was made about the sections in the Labour Relations Act (LRA) that
enable this review function by the labour courts . It is common cause that despite the
criticism levelled against it, the decision in Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus No and
others'" remains good law. The debate on whether or not a proper approach was used
in the aforegoing decision was put to closure by Zondo JP in Shoprite Checkers (Pty)
Ltd v Ramdaw No & other/1 when he made the following remarks:
The Carephon e debate has been going on for a long time. Nevertheless the
labour relations community has for sometime now organised its lines and
activities on the basis ofthat judgement ofthis court. I accept that some ofthe
criticism against Carephone is justified but, having regard to all the
circumstances and in order to bring about certainty and stability in the law in
this area, I think the debate must come to an end.
As a result of the Carephone decision, review proceedings must be brought before
the labour courts in terms of section 145 of the LRA. The said section prescribes
among other things the time limit within which proceedings must be brought before
the courts as well as the defects that may be raised against awards issued by
commissioners. It is this latter part of the section that is of significance to the
deliberations in this chapter. The defects or grounds for review are to be found at s
145(2) which states as follows:
40 Note 6 above, 1425
41 Note 33 above, 340
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'A defect referred to in subsection (i) means -
(a) that the commissioner-
(i) committed misconduct in relation to the duties of the
commissioner as an arbitrator
(ii) committed a gross irregularity in the conduct of the
arbitration proceedings; or
(iii) exceeded the commissioner's powers; or
(b) that an award has been improperly obtained
In practice, applicants tend to cite more than one of these grounds as a way of
enhancing their chances of influencing the courts to review and set aside an award
complained of. The courts have over time developed tests to deal with the various
grounds. As a court of both law and equity, creating precedents and certainty in the
process has not been an easy task. The afore going coupled with the tendency of the
court to set awards aside with specific instructions as to what should be done has
made the duties of the commissioners quite unenviable. In other respects, the court's
actions have been criticised to amount to appeal under the banner of a review. This
has attracted remarks such as, 'it is doubtful whether our jurisprudence recognises a
hybrid of an appeal and a review. 42 If it does, under what label does it parade and how
does one define its nature, content and scope?43
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the attitude adopted by the court in its
review of the defects referred to in section 145 and the impact this has had on the
conduct of arbitration proceedings. In other words, how far have the decisions of the
court been justifiable in relation to the reasons given for them?44 In the process one
would like to see the extent to which the courts have attempted to adhere to what is
expected of them in terms of their review function.
42 W Hutchinson ' Is the Labour Court Succeeding in its endeavours to create certainty in our
jurisprudence' (2000) 22 tU 2223,2225
43 Ibid, 2225
44 Note 6 above, 1425
13
3.3 Gross irregularity in the conduct of arbitration proceedings
An application may be made to the labour courts to have an award reviewed and set
aside on the grounds that the commissioner committed an act of gross irregularity in
the conduct of the arbitration proceedings. It is common cause that this concept is not
defined in the LRA. Neither is it defined in the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965 where a
similar defect may be brought against an award. Owing to this absence of definition,
the courts have crafted their own meaning as a way to resolve disputes brought about
on the basis of this ground. The meaning was dealt with in the context of the
Arbitration Act, which as observed earlier on, has an identical phrase as one of the
grounds of review. For example, in Bester v Easigas (Pty) Ltd and another." it was
remarked as follows:
We have not been ref erred to any decision by our courts where the phrase
'gross irregularity in the pro ceedings ' within the context of s 33(i)(b) of the
[Arbitration} act fo rmed the subject of consideration. Generally speaking, this
phrase is not however foreign to our law and it has in fact been discussed in a
number of reported cases. From these authorities it appears, firstly , that the
ground ofreview envisaged by the use of this phrase relates to the conduct of
the pro ceedings and not the result thereof
The court in the latter part of the above qoutation was referring to the dictum of
Mason J in Ellis v Morgan;Ellis v Dessal46 where it was stated as follows :
But an irregularity in proceedings does not mean an incorrect judgement, it
refers not to the result but to the method of a trial, such as, for an example,
some high-handed or mistaken action which has prevented the aggrieved party
from having his case fully and fairly determined
It appears from these authorities that not every irregularity in the proceedings will
constitute a ground for review of an award." In order to justify a review on the basis
45 1993 (1) SA 30 (c )
46 1909 TS 576, 581
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of gross irregularity, the irregularity must have been of such a serious nature that it
resulted in the aggrieved party not having his case fully and fairly determined.
The courts have gone further to state that gross irregularity can be categorised into
two classes. This was observed in Goldfields Investment Ltd and another v City
Council of Johannesburg and another48 where Schreiner J stated as follows :
It seems to me that gross irregularities fa ll broadly into two classes, those that
take pla ce openly, as part of the conduct of the trial - they might be called
patent irregularities - and those that take place inside the mind of the judicial
officer, which might be called latent. Of course, even the first class are only
material in as much as they prevent, or are deemed to prevent, the
magistrate's mind from being properly prepared for the giving of a correct
decision. But unlike the second they admit ofobjective treatment, according to
the nature ofthe conduct. Neither in the case oflatent nor in the case of patent
irregularities need there be any intentional arbitrariness of conduct or any
conscious denial ofjustice.
It was held in the same case that the crucial question is whether the actions of the
arbitrator, intentional or otherwise, prevented a fair trial of the issues. If it did prevent
fair trial of the issues then it is said to amount to a gross irregularity. By implication,
if it did not, then it will not constitu te a gross irregulari ty. Thus the test for irregularity
goes to the integrity of the hearing. 49 It is worth noting that the policy considerations
that underpinned the approach of the High Court in making decisions relating to the
provisions of the Arbitration Act differ from those that underlie the present LRA.
Whereas arbitration under the Arbitration Act is voluntary, arbitration under the LRA
is compulsory and underpinned by policy considerations such as the need to resolve
labour disputes speedily and efficiently.
47 Molot v Eujen No and Another (1997) 18 ILJ 1372 (Le) 1376
48 1938 TPD 551, 560
49 J Grogan (note 3 above) 618
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Despite these differing policy considerations, the present Labour Court is of the view
that the reasoning relating to gross irregularity as espoused by the High Court in the
above instance is equally applicable to the concept as is found in the LRA. There was
nothing to convince the courts that this reasoning could not be adopted to the present
. 50circumstances.
Having looked at what constitutes gross irregularity, one needs now to focus on the
case law that has emerged from review applications based on this ground. The aim is
to observe how the courts have discharged their review function in regard to this
ground. Instances where the courts have pronounced the presence of the defect as well
as where the applicants have failed to convince the courts as to the existence of the
defect under scrutiny will be considered. In the process it is hoped to find out the
extent to which the courts have endeavoured to confine themselves to review as
opposed to appeal.
There are various defects that have been put before the courts under the banner of
gross irregularity. The defects are considerable but the discussion shall be confined to
the following ; (a) the commissioner denied the applicants legal representation, (b) the
commissioner denied the applicants the opportunity to present evidence that they
deemed relevant to the case or (c) the commissioner ignored the material evidence
before him in his award and (d) the commissioner did not allow for the postponement
of the proceedings.
It must be conceded at the outset that the case law on this aspect is at times
contradictory, if not confusing. The confusion seems to stem from what is gross and
what is not. As observed by Du Toit, 51 it is not clear if the applicant would need to
show that the irregularity had a material effect on the award itself by prejudicing the
aggrieved party, or whether even if there is no prejudice as to outcome, the award
should stand, not merely on the 'no difference' princip le, but simply that the
irregularity was not gross.
50 Note 47 above, 1372
510 U Toit et al Labour Relations Law - A Comprehensive Guide 3 ed (2000) 618
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3.3.1 Legal Representation
The fact that parties have been denied legal representation In the arbitration
proceedings has on many occasions led to an application for review and the setting
aside of the award on the ground that the commissioner committed an act of gross
irregularity by so declining to allow such representation. Legal representation in
arbitration proceedings is regulated by section 140(1) 52 of the LRA. There are
instances where the courts have agreed with the applicants. For instance in Mthembu
and Mahomed Attorneys v CCMA and others" the applicants and the respondent
agreed that those wishing to have legal representation could do so at the arbitration
proceedings. However the respondent reneged on the agreement at the arbitration
proceedings and this resulted in the commissioner refusing to allow legal
representation for both parties.
The court, as per Landman J, was of the view that representation should have been
allowed in compliance with the agreement that was reached by the two parties. The
court observed that the harm that was caused to the applicant by this refusal was
incalculable and hence came to the conclusion that the refusal by the commissioner to
allow the applicant legal representation constituted gross irregularity.
52Section 140(1) reads :
(1) If the dispute being arbitrated is about the fairness of a dismissal and a party has
alleged that the reason for the dismissal relates to the employee's conduct or
capacity, the part ies , desp ite section 138(4), are not ent itled to be represented by
a legal practitioner in the arbitration proceedings, unless -
(a) the commissioner and the other parties consent; or
(b) the comm issioner concludes that it is unreasonable to expect a party to
deal with the dispute without legal representation , after considering -
(i) the nature of the questions of law raised in the dispute
(ii) the complexity of the dispute
(iii) the public interest; and
(iv) the comparative ability of the opposing parties or their
representatives to deal with the arbitration of the dispute
53 (1998) 19 ILJ 144 (LC)See also Ndtovu v Mullins No and another (1999) 20 tU 177 (LC)
where the fact that the commissioner allowed a self styled legal representative led to the
award being set aside . The court insisted that the commissioner ought to have consciously
and expressly addressed the question of legal representation.
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It has further been ruled that it is permissible to have a legal practitioner as an
observer in arbitration proceedings as long as he/she does not participate. This was
decided by the Labour Court in Pelletier v B & E Quarries (Pty) Ltd; B & E Quarries
(Pty) Ltd v CCMA and others54 where the commissioner did not allow legal
representation but nevertheless permitted the respondent's lawyer to observe the
proceedings. The applicants argued that this constituted a defect in that once the
commissioner has disallowed legal representation, he does not have the discretion to
allow the attorney to remain present during the proceedings. During these
proceedings, the attorney had apparently assisted in the clarification of certain issues
that were causing confusion. The court as per Kennedy AJ was of the view that the
employer did not suffer any injustice from the proceedings and hence the ground for
review was said to be without merit.
It seems that occasions where the courts have rejected the review on the basis of legal
representation are plentiful when compared with instances where commissioner 's
awards have been set aside on this defect. This is indeed a welcome development in
that it reflects that commissioners have applied the relevant section in accordance
with the spirit of the law. In County Fair Food (Pty) Ltd v CCMA and others55 the
applicants sought to have the award reviewed and set aside on the strength that they
were denied legal representation. The respondents were apparently dismissed for
refusing to work overtime. The court felt that the facts of the case were not
sufficiently complex to necessitate legal representation; on the contrary they were
simple and straightforward. In addition to this, the court held that the matter was not
of any public interest. Similar sentiments were expressed in Afrox Ltd v Laka and
others'" where the court as per Zondo J, as he then was, found that there was nothing
before it to suggest that the first respondent (commissioner) was ever told on what
basis it could be said that the dispute was complex. It ruled that this was a simple
54 (2000) 21 ILJ 624 (LC)
55 (1999) 20 ILJ 2609 (LC)
56 (1999) 20 ILJ 1732 (LC) see Vider Ruber Products (Pty) Ltd v CCMA and others (1998) 19
ll.J 1275 (LC) where a Labour relations consultant was denied the opportunity to represent
the company by the commissioner. The Labour court upheld the decision of the
commissioner.
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dispute largely dependent on facts. This was a matter in which the respondent
employees had been dismissed after assaulting a temporary employee during a strike.
Unfortunately, in instances where legal representation is the cause for a review, the
courts are almost left with no choice but to replace the decision of commissioners
with theirs. For instance, where legal representation is deemed to have been
unreasonably disallowed by the commissioner, the court almost orders that such be
allowed. The reverse of this situation is also true. That is, where representation has
been allowed and is deemed to have been inappropriate, the court simply orders that
there be no representation when the matter is re-heard. This appears perfectly logical
and hence it may not be fair to assess the ability of the courts to adhere to the
principles of review on the basis of this ground.
3.3.2 Evidence during arbitration proceedings
The evidence that is led during the arbitration proceedings is another area that has
prompted the reviewing and setting aside of awards. Very often applicants allege that
the commissioner did not allow them to lead evidence that they considered relevant to
the dispute. Alternatively, the parties taking the matter on review may allege that the
commissioner, in arriving at the award, did not apply his mind to the material
evidence before him. For example in Moloi v Euijen No and another,5? in which the
court dealt extensively with the interpretation of gross irregularity and in the process
made reference to the High Court decisions in Ellis v Morgan; Ellis v Desai58 and
Benjamin v Solac SA Building construction59, the labour court as per Maserumola AJ
came to the conclusion that the first respondent, the CCMA commissioner, did not
commit gross irregularity in the conduct of the arbitration proceedings and the
application was dismissed. An application had been made to the labour court to the
effect that certain evidence was not allowed by the first respondent and hence this
denied the applicant a fair hearing. The court remarked:
57
Note 47 above, 1372
58 Note 46 above, 576
59 1989 (4) SA 940 (C)
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In the present case, it cannot be said that the first respondent acted in a high-
handed f ashion or that he made a mistake which resulted in the applicant's
not having a fa ir and complete hearing. She was also given the opportunity to
give evidence and put her case before the first respondent. She was thus also
given a complete hearing.
Gross irregularity was said to have been committed by a commissioner who refused to
admit certain evidence in the arbitration - the commissioner refu sed to admit minutes
of the disciplinary hearing and the appeal hearing into evidence, the purpose of which
was to demonstrate the inconsistency betw een the version of a witness put before
arbitration and the version of the witness during the disciplinary enquiry. These
events transpired in Af rox Ltd v Laka and others60 and the court as per Zondo J,as he
then was, came to the conclusion that this was a case where the issue of credibility
played an important role and , if the appli cant sought to introduce evidence that was
going to show that the respondents were giving versions which were different from
those they had given at the disc iplinary hearing, such evidence should have been
admitted. Without making any findin g as to what constitutes gross irregularity, the
court found that the non-admission of the evidence precluded the applicant's case
from being fully and fairly determined.
It can be said that the irregulari ty occasioned in the event of denying parti es the
opportunity to lead evidence constitutes patent gross irregularity, whereas in
situations where the evidence is glaringly in front of the commissioner and he ignores
the same in the process of reaching his award , the irregularity may be said to be latent.
Perhaps one of the most classic examples of latent gross irregularity was dealt with in
the case of Toyota SA Motors (Pty) Ltd v Radebe and others.61 In this case, the
commissioner found that the respondent committed act s of fraud and gross dishonesty
60 Note 54 above, 1732 see Male/ane Toyota v CCMA (1999) 6 BLLR 565 (LC) where it was
affirmed that a fundamental requirement in any arbitration process is that the arbitrator must
consider and assess relevant evidence placed before him. Also see Legal Aid Board v John
No and another (1998) 19 /U 851 (LC) where the commissioner disallowed evidence sought
to be addressed by the applicant subsequent to the characterisation of the issue in a
particular way.
61 Note 36 above, 340
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but ordered his reinstatement. Thus the award was not supported by the evidence and
the findings of the commissioner. Similarly in the case of Abdull and Another v
Cloete No and others62 the Labour Court came to the finding that a gross irregularity
of a latent nature was committed by the commissioner who gave contradicting reasons
for his award. The Labour Court per Pretorius AJ stated:
The first respondent in this matter appears to have conducte d himself in a
manner which Schreiner J [in Goldfields] would have describ ed as latent
gross irregularity. An examination of his reasons indicates that he has failed
to appreciate what the LRA requires of him when arbitrating a dispute
referred to the CCMA. To paraphrase the words of Shreiner J, he has
misconceived the whole nature of the enquiry and his duties in connection
there with ...... In this context, a complete fa ilure to make the necessary
decisions or fin dings in a manner which is capa ble of reasonable
understanding, constitutes a gross irregularity as defin ed in s 145 of the LRA.
Finally, in the decision of the Director-General: Department of Labour v Claassen
and others" the court examined the material evidence before it and came to the
conclusion that there was no clear sign that the oral evidence and documentation as a
whole had been closely analysed and considered by the commissioner. The court as
per Tip AJ averred that there was no demonstration to be found in the award that the
conclusion was logically connected to the overall assessment and impact of the oral
evidence and documentation treated together and hence set aside the award. It must be
said that there are instances where commissioners have taken consideration of
evidence that was not led in the arbitration proceedings. This transpired in AA Bull
(Pty) Ltd v Kolisi and another.64 Neither party had alleged at any time that the notice
62 (1998) 19 ILJ 799 (LC)
63
(1998) 19 ILJ 1142 (LC) see also Kynoch Feeds (Pty) Ltd v CCMA and others (1998) 19 ILJ
836 (LC) where the court as per Reveals J came to the finding that the commissioner's
findings were unsupported by substantial evidence , that they were based on inferences of fact
and were not reasonably justifiable in terms of the evidence that was produced . See also
County Fair Food (Pty) Ltd v CCMA and others (1999) 20 ILJ 2609 (LC) where the
commissioner had relied on an expired collective agreement
64 (1998) 19 ILJ 795 (LC)
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of the meeting was too short, or that the first respondent had insufficient time to
prepare for the meeting. The court as per Revelas J remarked, ' in my view, to raise a
matter aft er proceedings have been concluded and not affo rding either party the
opportunity to make submissions in response thereto, is gross irregularity,
particularly having regard to the circumstances ofthis matter. '
3.3.3 Postponement of arbitration hearings
Another equally vexing issue is that of postponements of arbitration hearings. For
many partie s this is one of the most disturbing issue, as they prepare to put a case
before a commissioner (the preparation often entailing significant disruptions to the
lives of parties not directly involved - such as witnesses) , only to find that the other
party to the dispute fails to put in an appearance and the entire matter has to wait until
another day.'" The inconvenience caused by the postponement or the lack of it, where
the one party deems it necessary, has been a subject of many reviews. The issue is
regulated by section 138(5)66 of the LRA and it is quite evident from the same that
commissioners have a wide discretion in exercising their powers in relation to this
subjec t. This was confirmed in the Labour Appeal Court decision in Carephone" and
reaffirmed in the Labour Court decision of Frasers International Removals v CCMA
and others68 where the following remarks were made:
Commissioners enjoy a wide discretion with regard to granting
postponements. The labour court will not interfere with this discretion, unless
there are compelling reasons to do so. Accordingly, I cannot fi nd that the
refus al to postpone the matter amounted to an irregularity or to the second
respondent [the CCMA commissioner} exceeding his powers.
65 C. Mischke 'Practice and Procedure in the CCMA - The labour court lays down the law
(1999) 9 CLL 1,1
66 Section 138(5) provides that if a party to the dispute fails to appear in person or to be
represented at the arbitration proceedings, the commissioner may continue with the
arbitration proceedings in the absence of that party; or adjourn the arbitration proceedings to
a later date
67 Note 44 above, 1425
68 (1999) 7 BLLR 689 (LC) 694c
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The commissioner ' s discretion is unfettered and hence the courts have indeed found
compelling grounds to interfere with the same. The commi ssioner ' s discretion to
disallow postponement came under review in Dimbaza Foundaries Ltd v CCMA and
others69 where the employer was caught off guard by the employee's sudden change
of issues in dispute at the commencement of the arbitration proc eedings. The
employee had initially indicated that it would only challenge the sanction meted out
by the employer , but however changed to deny that it committed the misconduct
alleged. The employee in this case was represented by a union official who was an
admitted attorney with vast experience in labour litigation whereas the employer was
represented by a layman. The commissioner acknow ledged, in his award , that the
sudden turn of event s caught the employer' s representative off guard. It is common
cause that the employer did not request or apply for postponement of proceedings.
However the court held that the commission er ought to have guided the proc ess by
coming to the assistance of the employer. According to the court, the commissioner
erred by assuming that the employer had the knowledge to apply for postponement.
As a consequence of the commiss ioner's failure to guide the process fairly, his finding
on the evidence was said to have been affected and hence the award was set aside.
Events similar to thos e that transpired in the above case were brought to the same
court but this time around the court upheld the decision of the comm issioner not to
postpone. This was the case in Cementation (Africa contracts) (Pty) Ltd v CCMA and
others.
7o Despite the fact that the Dimbaza case was cited as the authority for
challenging the award, the court ironically made the following findings; 'It was not
incumbent on the second respo ndent to postpone the matter ofhis own accord in the
absence ofany indication that such a p ostponement was sought or that it would serve
any purpose.' The court did not motivate any grounds as to why it differed with the
Dimbaza dicta. There is vast case law to show that the courts would not lightly
69 (1999) 8 BLLR 779 (LC) See also Keeron Casa Hotel v Heinrichs and another (1999) 1
BLLR 27 (LC) where the commissioner's reason for not postpon ing the proceedings was that
the circumstances raised were not 'sufficiently exceptional '. The court set the decision aside
on the strength that this was a wrong test. The proper test was whethe r justice and fairness
required a postponement - in particular whether a postponement would prejudice the CCMA
and the employee and , if so, whether this could be alleviated .
70 (2000) 5 BLLR 573 (LC)
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interfere with the decision of the commissioner in these circumstances. For instance in
Ross and Son Motor Engineering v CCMA and others'' the applicant had declined to
attend proceedings at the CCMA on the grounds that the same did not have the
jurisdiction to arbitrate on the matter. On the day of the hearing, the applicant was
contacted telephonically by the CCMA to inform him that the hearing was proceeding
in his absence. At this point, the applicant requested a postponement which was
vehemently opposed by the union official representing the respondent. It is common
cause that the commissioner did not allow the postponement of the proceedings as he
was not satisfied with the explanation rendered by the applicant. The decision of the
commissioner was upheld on the basis that it was justifiable in relation to the reasons
given for it.
Finally in Seafood King v CCMA and others72 the applicant sought to review the
commissioner's award on the basis that the arbitration proceedings should not have
proceeded in its absence. The court said that the sole question to be asked on the basis
of the aforegoing was, did the arbitrator exercise his discretion properly in electing to
proceed with the arbitration in the applicant's absence and furthermore, did he apply
his mind to the matter in hand? Apparently the applicant was to be represented by a
consultant who was however denied audience as consultants do not have the right of
audience before the commission. Owing to the foregoing, the postponement could not
possibly be made on the basis of the commitments of a person who is not allowed
audience in arbitration. In upholding the decision of the commissioner, the Labour
Court made the following remarks:
The commission was created to play a crucial role in the resolution oJ labour
disputes. It goes through elaborate preparation to enrol matters for
conciliation and arbitration. Once a commissioner is reserved to conduct an
arbitration, the commission is liable to pay the commissioner his fee whether
the arbitration takes place or not. Other than the cost aspect, the commission
mustfitlfil the legislative objective oJexpeditious resolution oJlabour disputes.
if the commission were to postpone each and every arbitration where a party
71 (1998) 11 BLLR 1168 (LC)
72 (1999) 1 BLLR 42 (LC)
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is absent, it would fa il lamentably on this legislative objective. It is simply not
the duty ofthe commission to mollycoddle parties to appear at the arbitration
pro ceedings.
Reasons for review bordering on gross irregularity are quite vast. This is not
surprising if one considers that they relate to the manner in which the arbitration
proceedings are conducted. The few scenarios that have been referred to in this work
are sufficient to show among other things how the awards have fared, their impact on
the duties of the commissioners as well as the extent at which the Labour Courts have
adhered to the principle of review. It must be said that commissioners enjoy a wide
discretion as regards how they are to conduct arbitration proceedings. f It is common
cause that this discretion would be abused if there did not exist a forum where this
could be challenged. It follows that the duty of the labour court is to see to it that the
discretion is exercised within the confines and spirit of the LRA in particular and the
Constitution in general. As to how the awards have performed under the scrutiny of
the courts in as far as this defect is concerned, one must admit that there is no clear
cut answer. What is however useful is the impact these reviews have had in the
manner in which commissioners conduct their affairs. They have indeed acted as a
guide as to how one can best conduct proceedings to minimise situations where
unfairness is alleged. It is only unfortunate that at times the messages from the
reviewing body are contradictory and hence leave commissioners at a loss as to what
is it that is expected of them. For instance, if they are to be seen as impartial, to what
extent should they go in terms of advising a lay party without the risk of being
labelled biased.
It is evident from the analysis of cases falling under this defect that the courts have
striven to maintain the difference between a review and an appeal. This has not been
particularly easy where options in a particular situation are limited. For instance, as
alluded to earlier on, in situations of whether or not legal representation should be
73 The manner in which they are to conduct arbitration proceedings are regulated by section
138 of the LRA which states as follows at subsection (1) 'The commissioner may conduct the
arbitration in manner that the commissioner considers appropriate in order to determine the
dispute fairly and quickly, but must deal with the substant ial merits of the dispute with the
minimum of legal formalit ies.
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allowed . Finally it must be said that the courts have not come out clearly on what is
gross and what is not. In many occasions omissions detected have been readily
labelled gross, to the probable and understandable dismay of many commissioners.
3.4 Exceeding One's Powers [s 145(2)(b)(iii)]
The body of case law that has emerged in our courts does not create a clear distinction
between the concept of exceeding one's powers and that of gross irregularity. In many
instances, the courts have come to the findings that the commissioners ' actions
amounted to gross irregularity and exceeding ofhis powers on virtually similar factual
allegations . Perhaps this should not come as a surprise if one considers that the
Arbitration Act 42 of 196574 does not only amalgamate the two, but that there is a
considerable reliance on the case law generated from the defects entailed in this Act.
As a result of the overlap, cases cited under gross irregularity will feature in one way
or the other in the justification of this defect
Du Toie s submits that the concept of exceeding one's powers assumes two forms.
Firstly it denotes a situation where the commissioner strays from the ambit of his
jurisdiction or where he makes a ruling which is beyond the powers conferred by the
LRA76 and the Constitution in as far as it relates to the regulation of admini strative
power. Secondly, the phrase denotes a failure to use a power or a discretion that ought
to be used.77
It is evident from the case law that the first version of this concept is more prevalent
than the latter and can manifest itself in various forms. One of the most difficult duties
of the commissioners is to determine, on the basis of opening statements by the
parties, what is in dispute for that is not only important in terms of whether or not they
74 Section 33 of the Arbitration Act partly states that an award is set aside where an arbitration
tribunal has committed any gross irregularity in the conduct of the proceedings or has
exceeded his powers
75 Du Toit et al (note 51 above) 619
76 These powers are, in the case of compulsory arbitration, the powers conferred by the LRA
and include the exercise of such discretion as the law allows
77 Du Toit et al (note 75 above) 620
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have jurisdiction to preside over the matter, but also in terms of the questions to be
asked, evidence to be led and tests to be applied in the resolution of the case . Thus the
characterisation of the nature of the dispute has very often been a contested terrain
leading to allegations that the commissioner exceeded his powers . This is so because
once the nature of the dispute has been determined, then the commissioner in terms of
section 138(1)78 can only allow what he considers relevant evidence to be led. This
has indeed created discomfort and dissatisfaction in various quarters leading to
situations where awards are taken on review. An example of characterisation of the
nature of a dispute occurred in Legal Aid Board v John No and another ' where the
arbitrator gave a ruling that the issue before him was confined to 'whether there had
been an unfair labour practice by the board in not applying the audi alteram partem
before cancelling the payment ofthe allowance to Mr Hutchinson with effect from
December 1996. ' Pursuant to this ruling, the arbitrator ordered that the evidence be
confined to the issue as had been characterised by him. He disallowed evidence
sought to be adduced by the applicant in regard to the nature and content of the motor
scheme and whether Mr Hutchinson was entitled to the motor allowances.
The court as per Pretorius AJ did not accept the characterisation of the dispute
especially as regards the assertion that Mr Hutchinson should have been afforded the
opportunity to be heard in person before the withdrawal of the allowances.
Furthermore, the court was not comfortable with the characterisation as it denied the
applicants the opportunity to lead evidence relating to the nature and content of the
scheme. The court held that the commissioner did not only commit gross irregularity
in not affording the applicant a fair trial but also exceeded his powers in the process.
Exceeding one's powers may further take the form where there is a material error of
law committed by the arbitrator. Howe ver, not every error of law is capable of
rendering a decision of an arbitrator reviewable. f" It is indeed undesirable that that
should be the case because not only will that undermine the advantage of arbitration
78 s 138(1) states that the commissioner may conduct the arbitration in a manner that the
commissioner considers appropriate in order to determine the dispute fairly and quickly , but
must deal with the substantive merits of the dispute with the minimum of legal formalities.
79 (1998) 19 ILJ 851 (LC)
80 Mlaba v Masonite (Africa) Ltd and others (1998) 3 BLLR 291 (LC)
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which litigation lacks but also the system of the administration ofjustice would not be
able to cope with the amount of work that would result if every error of law were to
render decisions of arbitrator or lower courts or tribunals reviewable.
81
When then is
the error of law capable of rendering a decision of an arbitrator reviewable? This
question was explored by the High Court in Hira and another v Booyson and
another82 where Corbett Cl said the following:
Where the complaint is that the tribunal has committed a material error of
law, then the reviewability of the decision will depend, basically, upon
whether or not the legislature intended the tribunal to have exclusive authority
to decide the question oflaw concerned. This is a matter ofconstruction ofthe
statute conferring the power ofdecision.
The labour court has since declared that the legislature intended the CCMA to have
exclusive authority to decide the question of law83 and hence this leaves its error on
law reviewable. The labour court had the opportunity to decide on the allegation on
the material error of law in Mlaba v Masonite (Africa) Ltd and others.84 In this
decision , the applicant employee was dismissed for disobeying instructions he
deemed unlawful for it contravened his hours of work. The hours of work enforced by
the respondent employer turned out to contravene section 7 of the Basic of Conditions
of Employment Act (BCEA). The commissioner did not make reference to this
section in his award and as a result came to the finding that the instruction was lawful
and hence endorsed the dismissal imposed by the employer.
On review, the court explored whether the instruction was indeed lawful as per the
commissioner's award. The court found that the instruction was contrary to the
provisions of section 7 of the BCEA and ruled that it was therefore unlawful. It
followed that in concluding that the instruction was lawful, the second respondent
(commissioner) made an error of law. The error of law led the second respondent to
find that the applicant(employee) had had no good reason to disregard the instruction,
81 Note 80 above , 301
82 1992 (4) SA 69 (A)
83 Note 80 above, 302
84
Note 80 above, 300
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and to the ultimate decision that his dismissal was fair. The commissioner was said to
have exceeded his powers when he declared the instruction lawful contrary to the
provisions of the BCEA on this subject. A material error of law was further the
subject of contention in Rope, Constructions Co (Ply) Ltd v CCMA and others85
where upon finding that the dismissal was procedurally unfair, the commissioner
awarded compensation amounting to six months wages despite the fact that the period
between the employee 's dismissal and the final date of arbitration exceeded the
twelve months in relation to which the calculation of compensation in terms of section
194(1)86 is limited. The commissioner did not offer any reasoning to support the
exercise of his discretion and it was open to speculation whether, had he been
conscious of the fact that he was obliged to make an award of twice the amount in fact
decreed, he would have awarded compensation at all or whether the award constituted
merely an error of formulation. The court concluded that, whatever the position, this
aspect of the commissioner' s award amounted to him exceeding his powers and hence
could not be allowed to stand.
However it appears that the court will not always regard miscalculation of
compensation as amounting to exceeding one's powers. For instance in Zaayman v
Provincial Director: CCMA Gauteng and otIJers87 the commissioner miscalculated
the amount of compensation due to a dismissed employee and the court found that the
error had not amounted to excess of power.
Arbitrators have also been found to have exceeded their powers where they ignored or
misconstrued the appropriate statute or legal principles. Appropriate legal principle s
85 (2002) 23 ILJ 157 (LC) see also Johnson and Johnson (Pty) Lid v Chemical Workers
Industrial Union (1999) 20 ILJ 89 (LAC)
86 Section 194(1) is entitled 'limits on compensa tion' and states as follows : (1) If a dismissal is
unfair only because the employer did not follow a fair procedure compensation must be equal
to the remuneration that the employee would have been paid between the date of dismissal
and the last day of the hearing ofthe arbitration or adjud ication, as the case may be,
calculated at the employee 's rate of remuneration on the date of dismissal. Compensation
may however not be awarded in respect of any unreasonable period of delay that was caused
by the employee in initiating or prosecut ing a claim.
87 (1999) 1 BLLR 92 (LC)
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were not applied in Morkels Stores (Pty) Ltd v Woolfrey No and another
88
where the
employer dismissed several employees for violating picketing rules during a strike.
The applicant employee was one of the individuals who were identified to have
violated the agreed rules. In his award the arbitrator stated:
There is no question that the conduct of the picketers was contrary to both the
agreed picketing rules and to acceptable disciplinary norms. I am satisfie d
that the actions of the picketers were suffic iently serious to justify their
dismissal. However, the employer chose not to take disciplinary action against
the group. Instead it singled out individuals fo r discipline based on specific
acts of misconduct. The employee was one ofthose whom the employer chose
to discipline individually.
On the strength of the above submissions , the arbitrator was of the view that the
failure to take action against the group or those that were not identified nullified the
dismissal of the applicant employee. This he said despite the fact that the employer
conducted about fifty disciplinary inquiries resulting in only nine dismissals. It
follows that the employer could only prove misconduct deserving dismissals in nine
employees. How then was the employer to dismiss employees on a wholesale scale
when there was no proof of misconduct committed by the all? Furthermore, how
could he dismiss those that he could not identify? The court as per Revelas J held as
follows:
Employers cannot be precluded from taking disciplinary action against
individuals, prop erly identified as having conducted acts ofmisconduct simply
because, given the nature of the strike action and the number of employees
involved, the employer is unable to identify all of the individual transgresses.
Thus the commissioner concerned misconstrued the legal principle of consistent
application of discipline in circumstances that are similar. It could not be reasonably
said, without proof, that all involved in the strike violated the picketing rules. Hence it
was always going to be unfair for the employer to dismiss employees who conducted
88 (1999) 6 BLLR 572 (Le)
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themselves within the rules on the basis of a few who became a nuisance . Misconduct
is not a new phenomenon and so is individualised disciplinary action.
89
By so
misconstruing the aforesaid legal principle, the commissioner was said to have
exceeded his powers, for the power to afford relief to an employee in a dismissal
dispute, depends on the commissioner finding that there was no fair reason for the
dismissal.
It is possible to look at the above award from a different perspective. Given that the
remedy awarded by the arbitrator is derived from section 193,90 it can be argued,
rightly so, that the arbitrator failed to demonstrate understanding of the discretion in
the aforegoing section by awarding relief in respect of the applicant employee when
he had arrived at the findings that the misconduct committed was serious enough to
warrant dismissal as a sanction. Another example of failure to demonstrate
understanding of the discretion conferred by section 193 came to the fore in Polifin
Ltd v Sebeko No and another" where the commissioner made an award which read as
follows:
(a) Polifin did not act unf airly both procedurally and substantively when
terminating the services of Mr Yacob - it did what it reasonably could
under the circumstances;
(b) Should any vacancy arise in the company, Mr Yacob should be re-
emp loyed and be given pref erence, this is because J took account of the
report by Dr Rendree dated 30/05/97
89 See Rickett and Colman SA (Pty) Ltd v Chemical Workers Industrial Union and others
(1991) 12 ILJ 806 (LAC) 814 where the court said the following: it has is not been suggested
that the appellant had any ulterior motive in discip lining those whom he chose to discipline
and not disciplining those that were not in fact disciplined . Furthermore. as was recognised by
the Industrial Court, it is not unreasonable to take disciplinary action against those individuals
who could he identified. It is clear that the appellant had no evidence at his disposa l to identify
any other individual transgresses.
90 Section 193 is entitled remedies for unfair dismissal and unfair labour practice . It gives the
labour court and arbitrator various options in terms of remedies that may be awarded should
the dismissal be deemed unfair.
91 (1999) 20 ILJ 628 (LC)
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The company, Polifin, made an application to the court asking that paragraph (b) of
the award be set aside on the strength that the arbitrator exceeded his powers by so
making such an award. The court as per Landman J had this to say about the award:
This dispute was about an alleged unfair dismissal. It was f ound by the
commissioner, and this is common cause, that the dismissal was fa ir.
Notwithstanding this findin g, the commissioner went on to order that re-
employment take place if a position was to become available. In my opinion
that was not a course ofaction available to the commissioner. Section 193 of
the Act, which deals with remedies for unf air dismissal, permits an order for
re-employment in a fi nding that the dismissal is unf air. Where a commissioner
comes to the conclusion that the dismissal is fa ir, that is the end of the matter.
The commissioner has no power to order re-employment.
Failure to understand the discretion conferred by the LRA is not only confined to the
above cited section. In Superstar Herbs v CCMA and other/2 the court had to explore
whether the commissioner' s award was appropriate within the meaning of section
138(9)93 and whether there had been a failure of justice . The dispute involved the
dismissal of an employee for theft. The employee barely denied the offence or the act
of theft while the employer led elaborate evidence on the matter. The commissioner
put excessive weight on the employee's bare denial and held that the employer's
evidence required corroboration. The court's view was that the commissioner erred in
these instances by putting undue weight on the bare denial of the employee as well as
asserting that there should have been corroboration. The court was ofthe view that the
evidence led was enough to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that the employee
was guilty of dishonesty. The award was therefore inappropriate and not in the spirit
of section 138(9) of the LRA. By so awarding, the arbitrator was deemed to have
exceeded his powers.
92 (1999) 1 BLLR 58 (Le)
93 S 138(9) states: The commissioner may make any appropriate arbitration award in terms of
this Act (LRA), including, but not limited to, an award -
(a) that gives effect to any collective agreement ;
(b) that gives effect to the provisions and primary objects of this Act;
(c) that includes, or is in the form of a declarator order
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Another area that has been raised to challenge the awards of commissioners on this
defect relates to decisions or award s that are not ju stified by the evidence adduced.
This is one area where there is a great overlap between this defect and that of gross
irregularity." In Balfour/Siyathemba Transitional local authority v CCMA and
another 95 the arbitrator failed to take into consideration the hous ing agreement that
stipulated how housing allowances were to be paid out to employees. Despite the fact
that the housing agreement was adduced as evidence, the commissioner ignored it in
arriving at his findings that the employee was entitled to hou sing allowance. The
labour court found to the contrary and said that the commissioner erred in finding that
the employee was quali fied to be granted a home ownership allowance. The court as
per Mlambo J was of the view that the commissioner did not apply his mind to the
matter as required by the LRA and exceeded his powers when he ignored key
evidence put before him .
Ignoring evidence as adduc ed is one aspect of this wide area. Other aspects are such
as making incorrect findings from evidence put before the arbitrator, basing the award
on inadequate evidence and drawing inferences inappropriately. The arbitrator was
said to have drawn inappropriate inferences in Kynoch Foods (Pty) Ltd v CCMA and
94 Basson J submitted in Seardel Group Trading (Pty) Ltd tla the Bonwit Group v Andrews No
and others (2000) 21 IU 1666 (LC) that this ground of review (exceeding of powers by
arbitrators) can be better accommodated under either misconduct or gross irregularity in its
extended sense.
95 (1998) 9 BLLR 923 (Le) see also Dimbaza Foundries Ltd v CCMA and others (1999) 20
IU 1763 (LC) where the court examined the award in the light of the evidence and noted that
the commissioner had failed to apply his mind to several issue. The court concluded that the
process was unfair, inequitable and procedurally unfair and led to an unjustifiable conclusion
and in the absence of fairness, the commissioner had exceeded his powers; Venture Motor
Holdings Lld tla Williams Hunt Delta v Biyana and others (1998) 19 IU 1266 (LC) where the
court having reviewed the evidence placed before the commissioner agreed that the
commissioner had in no significant way applied himself to the highly relevant evidence which
had been placed before him. A fundamental requirement in any arbitrtation proceedings had
not been met, namely that relevant evidence had to be taken into account and reasonably
assessed and that the outcome had to be reasonably connected.
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others'? where the respondent employee resigned for personal and domestic reasons
and later claimed severance pay from the applicant employer. The employee would
have been retrenched but was offered redeployment and when his wife could not find
a job at or near where he was relocated, he decided to resign and claim severance pay
as if he was retrenched. It is common cause that the commissioner granted the
employee severance pay. In setting aside the award, the court said that the
commissioner's award was unsupported by substantial evidence, that it was based on
inferences of fact and was not reasonably justifiable in terms of the evidence that was
produced. The court further found that the arbitrator did not take proper account of the
relevant provisions of the LRA regarding paym ent of severance pay.
As mentioned from the onset, there are instances in this defect which relates to failure
to exercise the discretion as it is the expectation owing from the powers bestowed by
the LRA. Limited case law on this area suggest that allegations relating to the
aforegoing have failed to see the light of the day or are hardly raised given the wide
discretion within which commissioners operate. However similar allegations have
been raised in terms of the Arbitration Act where a similar defect may be raised
against an award. For example in Seardel Group Trading (Pty) Ltd tla The Bron wit
Group v Andrews No and Anothel7 where the issue in dispute was whether or not the
arbitrator may interfere with a sanction imposed by an employer. During the
proceedings, the arbitrator' s attention was drawn to the Labour Appeal Court decision
in County Fair Foods (Pty) Ltd v CCMA and othel8 where the interference on the
sanction impo sed by the employer was discussed at length. Despite being made aware
of this authority, the arbitrator ignored to make reference to the decision in his
96
(1998) 19 ILJ 836 (Le) see to the contrary Purefresh Foods (Pty) Ltd v Dayal and another
(1999) 5 BLLR 518 (LC) where the commissioner found that the employee was entitled to
severance pay despite the fact that the employer had been instrumental in securing
alternative employment for him with the purchaser of the employer's business. The court
found that the commissioner's findings were not reviewable because, even if it was wrong in
law, it would not be set aside unless an injustice had been committed. An injustice would be
committed if a party was deprived of a fair hearing or if a commissione r failed to apply his
mind to the evidence before him.
97 Note 92 above, 1676
98 (1999) 20 ILJ 1701 (LAC)
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findings and it was the contention of the applicants that he failed to exercise his
discretion by so failing to take cogniscence of this dicta.
The labour court found that the arbitrator exceeded his powers by not making
reference to the authority availed to him without motivating any reasons as to why he
did not. It was said that he failed to exercise the discretion expected of him. Similarly
in Stocks Civil Engineering (Pty) Ltd v Rip No and another99 the arbitrator failed to
make reference to an important decision in the matter that was being dealt with. The
subject of contention was compensation resulting from an unfair dismissal. The court
was of the view that the arbitrator acted dysfunctionally in respect of his approach to
the question of compensation by disregarding the principles expounded in Johnson
and Johnson (Pty) Ltd v Chemical Workers Industrial Union100 thereby materially
limiting his discretion. On the basis of the afore going the award could not stand.
The authorities cited so far to show how the defect under scrutiny has fared in the
courts may give the impression that litigants are always successful in challenging
awards on this ground. There is however a great body of case law to show that the
courts would not readily view the actions of the arbitrators to amount to this defect. In
Moloi v Euijen No and anotherr" the applicant 's application for review was based on
three grounds viz: that the commissioner committed a gross irregularity in the conduct
of the proceedings: that the commissioner exceeded his powers and that the award
was improperly obtained. The issue in dispute was the characterisation of the dispute
by the arbitrator. Whilst the employee party alleged that she was not allowed to lead
evidence on the existence of her dismissal, something which she said was an issue in
dispute, the arbitrator denied that this was the issue in dispute and said what was in
dispute was the exact date of the employee's dismissal. Elsewhere in this work the
characterisation was discussed and in those instances, arbitrators were found to have
exceeded their powers. Howe ver in this instance the court as per Maserumule AJ
found otherwise. The following remarks were made:
99 (2002) 23 ILJ 358 (LAC)
100 Note 85 above, 89
10 1
(1997) 18 ILJ 1374 (LC) note also 87 above, 92
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I am unable to fi nd that the first respondent (commissioner) exceeded his
powers in any way. In terms of s 138(1) of the Act, a commissioner, such as
the fi rst respondent, is empowered to conduct an arbitration in a manner that
he considers appropriate in order to determine the dispute fairly and quickly .
This power, in my view, includes the power to decide what evidence will be
allowed or disallowed. Insof ar as the fi rst respondent may have taken the view
that evidence in relation to the alleged shortage of petty cash could not be led
or relied upon to justify the applicant's dismissal, this f alls within his
competency to decide on the manner ofhow the arbitration is to be conducted.
Applicant's claim fo r relief on this ground must accordingly, also fa il.
It is clear from the above deci sion that the courts will not lightly interfere with the
discretion of the arbitrators unless the same is deemed to have been unjustl y and
unfairly exercised to the extent that it denies one of the parties not only a fair hearing
but a decision that is connected to the reasons given for it. As a result of the
afore going, it has not been an easy task to prove this defect in the light of these wide
powers . The misfortune however is that the courts do not seem to make a refined
distinction between the various defects. Although du toit' s categorisation of this
defect seems quite comprehensible, examples of the same emerging from our courts
seem to suggest that the court has used the ground in ways far removed from du toit' s
explanation. The tendency to widen the scope of this defect has inevitably led to the
blurring of the distinction that has to exist between this ground and other grounds for
review. It is my submission that we would see less ofreviews before the courts if the
simple explanation given by du toit , which does not seem restrictive in anyway, was
to be the basis for reviewing decisions of the commi ssioners under this ground.
There is no doubt that the review function of the courts have had a great impact on the
decisions of the commissioner in as far as this defect is concerned. For instance one
cannot find that the dismissal was fair but nevertheless award compensation or
reinstatement on the strength that they have the discretion to do so. In other words this
discretion cannot be exercised outside of the relevant statutes and the case law
generated by the courts . However this is eas ier said than done as the situations differ
from one case to the other.
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Whether or not the courts have maintained the not so easy to maintain distinction
between an appeal and review appears doubtful. There are several instances where the
courts have replaced the decisions of the commissioners with their own on the
strength that their rulings make it a foregone conclusion as to the next cause of action.
The actions of the Labour Courts seem to stem from s 145(4)(a) and (b) which states
as follows:
(4) Jfthe award is set aside, the labour court may-
(a) determine the dispute in the manner it considers appropriate; or
(b) make any order it considers appropriate about the procedures to
be followed to determin e the dispute
For instance in the Superstar Herbs case, the court was called upon to determine a
dispute relating to dishonesty. The commissioner had ruled that the employer had
failed to prove a case of dishonesty and reinstated the employee. The court found to
the contrary and went on to state:
I do not deem it wise to refer the dispute back to the commission for a fresh
arbitration. I am satisfied that Madikwa was involved in dishonesty conduct.
In terms of section 145(4)(a) I will determine the dispute. I find that
Madikwa 's dismissal was for a fair reason. I do not award any costs as same
were not requested nor was the application opposed. It stands to reason that
the application in terms ofsection 158(1)(c ) whereby Madikwa seeks to have
the award made the order ofcourt, must fail.
It is common cause that no reasons were motivated as to why the matter could not be
remitted to the commission except that the court was satisfied that a case of
dishonesty was proved. In other decisions, the courts reasoned that its rulings made
next cause of action obvious and hence the decision to replace the award. This was the
case in Mlaba v Masonite (Africa) Ltd and other/o2 where the court as per Zondo J
(as he then was) came to the following conclusion:
102 Note 80 above, 303
37
Having considered which of the two courses J should follow, J have come to
the conclusion that this court should not remit the matter but should decide it
itself. J have arrived at this conclusion because, in my view, it would serve no
useful purpose to remit the matter as the end result is, with respect, a foregon e
conclusion. To do so will simply cause an unnecessary delay in the resolution
of the dispute between the parties - a delay which, it seems to me, will be
prejudicial to both the applicant and the first respondent.
The issue before the court was whether or not the instruction disobeyed by the
applicant was legal. The second respondent had mad e an award to the effect that the
instruction was lawful and hence dismissal resulting from failure to obey it was fair.
The court found to the contrary. The instru ction was found to be illegal as it went
against certain provisions of the BCEA. It was the view of the court that the only
logical conclusion from the above findings was that the dismissal was unfair and
hence this foregone conclusion could not be remitted to the second respondent. The
only question that the second respondent was left with to consider was that of relief.
Even then the court motivated some reasons for deciding on this matter saying it will
be unfair to the applicant to remit the matter. Finally in Balfour/Siyath emba
Transitional Local Athority v CCMA and another/G3 the court was called upon to
decide whether the first respondent, Tsotetsi, qualified to be granted a home
ownership allowance in the light of the housing agreement that was entered into
between him and his employer, the applicant. The commissioner had found that he
was entitled to the housing allowance. The court found that the commissioner erred
when he found that the first respondent was entitled to a housing allowance as he did
not make reference to the housing agreement. The award was therefore found to be
inappropriate and set aside. It was however not remitted to the second respondent on
the reasons almost a replica of the previous case. The court as Mlambo J reasoned as
follows:
J flOW have to consider whether it is expedient to refer the matter back to the
commission for further attention by another commissioner. J am of the view
that to refer it back would serve no purpose in view of my finding that the
103 Note 95 above, 926
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language of the house ownership agreement is very clear that Tsotetsi does
not qualify f or the housing allowance. There is therefore no need to refer the
dispute back fo r furth er consideration by the commission. I therefore
determine it on the basis that the applicant does not qualify for the housing
allowance.
A recap on what constitutes a review would show that the courts could consider the
merits of the matter in one way or another. However in doing so the Judge concerned
should know that he enters into the merits not in order to substitute his or her own
opinion on the correctness thereof, but to determine whether the outcome is rationally
justifiable. l''" What we have seen in the aforegoing decisions is the entering into the
merits of the case by the courts and the ultimate replacement of the arbitrator's award
by the decision of the court . This obviously smacks of an appeal. It.is quite evident
that if the test was to be that of a foregone conclusion, then the courts would
determine two thirds of the cases that come before them, for they end in a state that
we find the above decisions. It however seem the courts would selecti vely advance
reasons from time to time as to why they intend determining the dispute to a point
where they make their own decision. In the final analysis, the above case law goes to
show the fragile distinction between an appeal and a review in our courts . At most
how difficult it has been to maintain the distinction. An escalation of this tendenc y
can only serve to undermine the integrity of the CCMA as an organisation intended to
be a first stop in the resolution of disputes in this country.
104 Du Toit et al (note 75 above) 620
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3.5 Misconduct in relation to the duties of an arbitrator [s 145(2)(a)(i)]
There are few cases where commissioners have been found guilty of misconduct.
Litigants usually allege a host of defects including misconduct, but indications are
that they are more often successful in proving other reviewable faults than it is the
case with misconduct. It follows that it is generally difficult to convince or prove that
there has been a case of misconduct on the part of the commissioner to a point where
. d l' f . . 105the courts have expressed concern over unsubstantiate Calms 0 impropriety.
However, as a way of establishing what constitutes misconduct, the labour court as
per Stelzner AJ in County Fair Foods (Pty) Ltd v Theron No and other/
o6
described
misconduct in relation to arbitration proceedings as follows:
For there to be misconduct, it has been held that there must be some
"wrongful or improper conduct" on the part of the decision-maker in this
instanc e the commissioner. Misconduct has also been described as requiring
" I' d ,,/07 J ,1 J d . . ksome persona turpitu e on t le part oj t le ectston-ma er.
105 Note 22 above, 131 where the court said, to accuse the first respondent, a commissioner
appointed by the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration, of not applying his
mind is one thing, but to accuse him of impropriety without substantiating that accusation
borders on contempt.. ..It does a great disservice to our public institutions to weigh in with
unsubstantiated claims of impropriety.
106 Note 55 above, 2649 see also Dickinson and Brown v Fisher's Executors 1915 AD 166,
176; see also Reunet Industries (Pty) Ltd tla Reutech Defence Industries v Naicker and
others (1997) 12 BLLR 1632 (LC) 1638C where it is stated that a gross mistake of law or fact
may be indicative of misconduct ..... Mistake, no matter how gross is not misconduct; at most,
gross mistake may provide evidence of misconduct in the sense that it may be so gross or
manifest that it could not have been made without misconduct on the part of the arbitrator.
Gross carelessness may also constitute evidence of misconduct. Not much is said as to what
constitutes gross carelessness. See also Amalgamated and Textile Workers Union v
Veldspun Ltd 1994 (1) SA 162 (A) where Goldstone JA (as he then was) stated that
misconduct does not extend to bona fide mistakes the arbitrator may make whether as to fact
or law.
107 The Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary defines turpitude as a state or quality of being
wicked
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As a way of explaining the aforegoing remarks, the court provided a test to the effect
that the basic standards of proper conduct for an arbitrator are to be found in the
principles of natural justice, and in particular the obligation to afford the parties a fair
and unbiased hearing. It follows from these principles that a commissioner must
conduct the proceedings before him in a fair, consistent and even-handed manner.
This means that he must not assist, or be seen to assist, one party to the detriment of
the other. It must be noted that the labour courts have drawn much from the High
Court decisions where similar defects emanating from the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965
were the basis for reviewing arbitrators' awards.108 It is evident from this case law
that other than assuming the form ofbias109, misconduct has manifested itself in other
forms such as gross negligence or gross mistake of law or fact.110 The latter form of
misconduct has seen to its overlap with other defects such as gross irregularity and
exceeding of powers by commissioners.
In instances where commissioners have been accused of bias, the courts have applied
a strict test that the same must be objectively established. To explore bias as a form of
misconduct, one perhaps ought to start from the provisions of the LRA that sanction
the appointment of commissioners as arbitrators. It is essential to do so because one of
the basis for challenging the commissioners' awards has been the relationship that the
arbitrator has had with one of the parties in the dispute. It is common cause that
section 136 of the LRA contains certain provisions relating to the appointment of a
commissioner for the purpose of arbitration proceedings. In s 136(3) provision is
made for a party to object to the commissioner who conducted the conciliation being
the one to conduct the arbitration. Section 136(4) stipulates that if such objection is
108 See 2 above relating to the nature and content of misconduct as has been perceived
under the Arbitration Act. Other authorities are; Donner v Ehrlich 1928 WLD 159; allied
Mineral Development Corporation v Gemsbok Vlei Kwartsiet 1968 (1) SA 7 ©; Kolber and
aonther v Sourcecom Solutions (Pty) Ltd and others 2001 (2) SA 1097 (C)
109 In Franklin v Minister of Town and Country Planning 1948 AC 84 (HL) 'bias' is said to
denote the departure from the standard of even-handed justice which the law requires from
those who occupy judicial office or those who are commonly regarded as holding a quasi-
judicial office
110 Du Toit et al (note 75 above) 617
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made , the commission must appoint another commissioner. Section 136(5) makes
provision for parties to indicate a preference in respect of arbitrator.
It is evident that none of the above sections specifically provide for an objection to be
made to the appointment of a particular commissioner on the apprehended view that
they may not conduct the proceedings fairly. On the strength of the aforegoing, it is
no wonder that some commissioners when faced with this allegation give the
following defence:
There is no provision in the Act for a commissioner to disclose where he
comes fro m by way of disclosing his background. It is not a practice in any
CCMA proceedings fo r an arbitrator to disclose his/her background prior to
commencing arbitration pro ceedings .....The CCMA has appo inted
commissioners f rom various fields and professions .....It has never occurred to
me in any arbitration proceedings that I have to disclose my previous
involvement. Neither is it a requirement as indicated above. II I
The above defence was rendered despite the fact that the Code of Conduct of
Commissioners issued in terms of section 117112 provides that commissioners must
disclo se any interest or relationship likely to affect their impartiality or which might
create a perceptio n of partiality.i':' This obviously amounted to deliberate
misrepresentation of facts in the light of the stipulations of the Code of Conduct for
Commissioners and hence the need for the courts to stamp on this conduct.
Commissioners are indeed aware of the provisions of the code and where
circumstances justify and permit, have recused themselves from the proceedings in
111 Venture Motor Holdings Lid t/a Williams Hunt Delta v Biyana and others (1998) 19 IU
1266 (LC)
112 Section 117(6) states that the governing body must prepare a code of conduct for the
commissioners and ensure that they comply with the code of conduct in performing their
functions.
113 Clause 4 of the Code of Conduct for Commissioners. Under this head commissioners
should disclose financial, and personal interests, as well as financial, business, professional,
family or social relationships.
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the interest of fairness. This has not been possible in every situat ion though. For
instance in Kwazulu Transport (Ply) Ltd v Mnguni and others1l 4 the commi ssioner
was of the view that the objections were without merit and hence made the following
remarks; 'I considered and rejected the application. In terms of CCMA Code of
Conduct I am bound to disclose any relationship with either ofthe parties, and recuse
myself ifnecessary. But in this case I have no relationship with either DELATUSA or
the applicant employee.I IS Even if the Code of Conduct was not to be invoked , the
courts have adopted the attitude that the capacity of a party to raise such objection has
its origins in the common law. Thus where a party has a reasonably well-founded
apprehension that it will not receive an impartial and unbiased hearing, it will be
entitled to seek relief. 116 This is because the common-law considerations relating to
impartiality of an arbitrator and consequ ently the duty of disclosure, apply no less
strongly where arbitration is compulsory than they do where the entry into arbitration
is voluntary.ll7Allegations relating to bias often take two forms, firstly that the
arbitrator had a past relationship with either of the parties and secondly that the
arbitrator' s conduct during the arbitration was suggestive of bias .
The commissioner' s past relationship with one of the parties came under scrutiny in
Venture Motor Holdings Ltd tla Williams Hunt Delta v Biyana and others118 where
the commissioner had failed to disclose that he had been previously employed as a
legal advisor by the third respondent trade union of which the employee was a
member and by whom she was represented. On the strength of the facts of the case,
the court as per Tip AJ made the following observations:
114 (2000) 22 ILJ 1646 (Le) 1651
115 It shall be seen later on that the commissioner indeed once had a strong relationship with
the respondent employee
116 BTR Industries SA (Ply) Lld and others v Metal and Allied Workers union and another
(1992) 13 IU 803 (A) where the court stated that the test is that of 'reasonable suspicion of
bias' as opposed to the 'real likelihood of bias.' Thus provided that the suspicion of partiality is
one which might reasonably be enterta ined by a lay litigant, a reviewing court cannot be
called upon to measure in a nice balance the precise extent of the apparent risk. If suspicion
is reasonably apprehended then that is an end of the matter.
117 Note 111 above, 1268
118 Ibid 1268
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It is no means required of a CCMA commissioner who undertakes a
conciliation or arbitration that he or she should in each and every case
pref ace proceedings with the exposition of his or her background. But where,
as in the present case, there was a lengthy and close relationship between the
commissioner and one of the parties, then a clear duty arises to make
disclosure of such fact. In the circumstances, I find there to be considerable
merit in the complaint raised by the applicant.
A case of failure to recuse oneself was yet the subject of contention in Kwazulu
Transport (Pty) Ltd v Mnguni and others.1l 9 Subsequent to becoming aware of the
past relationship between the commissioner and the employee, the employer made an
application to the effect that the commissioner recuse himself to which he declined.
The commissioner had represented employees in labour litigation against the
employer on at least three occasions as a labour consultant. After setting out the test
as was done in the ETR Industrie/2o case and having regards to the facts in the case,
the court as per Pillay J came to the following conclusion:
A person who renders services not only as a commissioner but also as a
representative ofone ofthe parties before the CCMA should recuse himselfor
herselfwithout hesitation if the apprehension ofbias is based on the dual role
played by the commissioner. A commissioner who has litigated against a party
who is scheduled to appear before him or her should disclose that fact
immediately she or he receives notice of the hearing and offer to recuse
herselfor himself An early and timeous response by the commissioner would
avoid delay and the costs ofan aborted process.
It was further observed by the honourable court that the commissioner' s failure to
disclose his past relationship with the respondent (employee) was, at best, negligent
and, at worst, a deliberate misrepresentation which amounted to gross misconduct. In
its view, the misconduct created doubt about the commissioner's suitability to serve
as such and said this should be brought to the attention of the Director and the
119 Note 114 above, 1651
120 Note 116 above, 803
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Convening Senior Commissioner of Kwazulu-Natal. Lastly in Ellerine Holdings Ltd v
CCMA and others 121 the court found that the CCMA committed a reviewable
irregularity by reversing its earlier decision to appoint another commissioner to
arbitrate a dispute after it had received an objection by one of the parties to the
appointment of the original arbitrator.
From the scenarios where the commissioners have been found to have faulted by
failing to recuse themselves, it is quite clear that the court will not lightly view any
form of past relationship between the commissioner and any of the parties. It seems
the court would prefer commissioners to offer to recuse themselves even when they
may hold the view that the same cannot cloud their best judgement. This is different
from disclosing one's background for the parties to decide . What seems to matter
however is what one of the parties may allege should things not turn out in their
favour. It is indeed imperative that commissioners disclose their past so that where
objection is raised the party that does raise such objection is given the opportunity to
motivate reasons for the objection. This is necessarily so because I do not believe that
every past relationship can lead to a situation where the commissioner cannot properly
apply his mind objectively and fairly to facts before him. For instance, most
commissioners are academics and are likely in one way or the other to come across
their former students either as Industrial relations managers or lawyers .:To suggest
that they should recuse themselves when ever this comes to light will indeed make a
meal of the concept of bias. Commissioners are no doubt part of the society and hence
interact in various ways. If these interactions easily make one susceptible to bias, then
one day we may not have commissioners to arbitrate disputes. Perhaps the test should
not only go as far as establishing that a relationship of some sort existed, but rather
even if it did exist, whether it can be reasonably said that the same could have a
bearing on the impartiality of the commissioner concerned.
The second form of bias alleged by litigants usually relates to the manner in which
the commissioner conducted the arbitration proceedings. This is often in the form of
remarks or interventions that slhe makes in the course of the proceedings. It should be
borne in mind that the LRA gives commissioners wide-ranging powers as to how they
121 (2002) 23 ILJ 1282 (Le)
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should conduct arbitration proceedings. In the words of Ingrid de Villiers, ' they have
an almost unfettered discretion as to how conciliation and arbitration proceedings
should be conducted.' 122 The power to conduct arbitrations derives from sections
138(1) and (2).123 However wide, the power has to be exercised within the principles
of justice and fairness. It follows that if these principles and others that one need not
mention here are not followed, the courts would not hesitate to set awards aside. Thus
the courts have from time been called upon to find out if the commissioner did not
conduct himself in a manner that is suggestive of bias especially in his inquisitorial
role. For example in Venture Motor Holdings LTD tla Williams Hunt Delta v Biyan a
and others ' i" the applicants alleged that the commissioner interfered in the
questioning of the employee by suggesting a possible explanation for what in the face
of it would otherwise be a telling piece of evidence against her. The court held that
the intervention was strongly suggestive of bias on the part of the commissioner in
favour of the employee. It was further found that even if it fell short of actual bias, it
was a grossly irregular intervention by the commissioner and it was certain to and in
fact did fuel the belief held by the company that it was not receiving a fair hearing.
Incidents of bias almost similar to the above were alleged in Mutu al and Federal
Insurance Co Ltd v CCMA 125. The commissioner was alleged to have made a
statement to the effect that managers of Mutual and Federal insurance were
incompetent. It was further alleged that, after a witness was excused subsequent to
leading evidence, the commissioner made comments to the effect that with his many
122 I de Villiers 'Behind the closed doors: Reviewing the conduct of CCMA commissioners '
(2001) 10 CLL 71 ,71
123 Section 138(1) and (2) of the LRA provides:
(1) The commissioner may conduct the arbitration in a manner that the commissioner
considers appropriate in order to determine the dispute fairly and quickly, but
must deal with the substantial merits of the dispute with the minimum of legal
formalities.
(2) Subject to the discretion of the commissioner as to the appropriate form of the
proceedings, call witnesses of any other party, and address concluding
arguments to the commissioner.
124 Note III above , 1266
125 (199 7) 12 BLLR 1610 (L C)
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years of experience, he already knew what the case was all about. On the strength of
the aforegoing evidence, the court as per Jali AJ made the following findings:
IfI consider these two comments by the commissioner, which I do believe were
unwarranted in whatever context they were made, I am disposed to agreeing
that a lay litigant in the position of the applicant and its witnesses was likely
to form an impression that the commissioner was partial to the employee's
case. Both comments were made during and only after the velY first witness
had led his evidence. The applicants then (respondents in this occasion) had
not even led their evidence regarding the incident which had been the subj ect
matter of the enquiry. At the time it could not have been said that the
commissioner had an objective evaluation and analysis of the evidence to
reach the conclusion he had reached about the applicant 's case.
Apart from the allegations dealt with above, there were others such as regular
interruptions, shouting at the company's witne sses and cross-examination in an
aggressive manner. The court felt that there was no merit in these allegations as the
commissioner acted within the powers granted by sections 138(1) and (2)126 of the
Labour Relations Act. However in Commuter Handling Services (Pty) Ltd v Mokoena
and others127 in circumstances that almost mirrored the above, the court was of the
view that the arbitrating committed acts of misconduct. The commissioner was
alleged to have hurried up the employer in the giving of evidence, interrupted and
interfered with the conduct of the case. The court observed that even though a
commissioner has the power to conduct arbitration proceedings in a manner that the
commissioner considers appropriate in order to determine the dispute fairly and
quickly under the provisions of section 138(1)1 28 of the LRA, this does not give him
the power to depart from the principles of natural justice. Thus although it lies within
the commissioner ' s powers to decide whether to adopt an inquisitorial or adversarial
mode of fact finding , once this decision has been made it ought to be consistently
applied to both parti es.It must be admitted that there is a wide range of incidents that
126 See 123 above
127 (2002) 23 ILJ 1400 (Le)
128 Note 123 above
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have been brought up by litigants as indications of bias from commissioners such as
refusal to allow legal representation129, being found in the arbitration room with one
party when the other has not arrived or left early130, and that these failed to see the
light of the day for they were proved to be frivolous.
Lastly, misconduct bordering on gross negligence or gross mistake of law or fact has
led to the blurring of the line between this defect and gross irregularity. Very often
reasons motivated for gross irregularity are raised when justifying gross misconduct
on the strength of the above grounds. As these grounds have been dealt with when one
was discussing gross irregularity as a defect, it would certainly amount to duplication
if they were to be raised here for there is an overlap between the two.
It has already been noted at the beginning of this work that there is limited case law
on this defect than it is the case with other defects. Although a wholesale of factors
are often alleged to enhance one' s chances of success, it appears that diminished
success rate in this area has made it less attractive. More often than not it is a case of
sour taste than anything substantial. The little case law that exists bears testimony to
this and in a way put the activities of the commissioners in a good light.
However, there are indeed incidents that are deserving of the sympathy of the courts
as they were glaringly irregular as to suggest that the arbitrator was biased. Owing to
these findings, it is possible that commissioners are increasingly recusing themselves
where circumstances are similar to these findings. Unfortunately the CCMA does not
keep a record of these recusals and the reasons leading to the same for they were to
show that commissioners do excuse themselves when they are of the view that they
cannot fairly handle a matter. The record would have further shown applications
129 In Afrox v Laka and others (1999) 20 /U 1732 (LC) the commissioner denied applicants
legal representation and this was deemed to amount to bias. The court held that the test for
qualifying bias was not satisfied and the issue was without any merit.
130 In Motol v Euijin and another (1997) 18 /U 1372 (LC) it was alleged that the commissioner
held a secret meeting with the respondents subsequent to the completion of the arbitration
proceedings. The respondents had apparently remained while the applicants left immediately.
The court remarked; the question is whether each time that one party to an arbitration departs
from the venue first, knowingly leaving a commissioner and a representative of the other party
behind, gives rise to a secret meeting and taints the commissioner with bias, impartiality and
dishonest conduct. In the court's view this did not.
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objecting to the appointment of commissioners on the strength that they would be bias
and why they failed. This is an important part of the equation for it makes a difference
between a genuine delay and a frivolous one, a thing that can ultimately affect speedy
resolution of dispute s.
The courts have to a greater extent maintained the distinction between an appeal and
review in handling this defect. In almost all the authorities that were visited, the courts
remitted the matters to the commission albeit with an instruction that a different
commissioner be appointed to arbitrate on the matter.
3.6 The Award was improperly obtained [s 145(2)(b)]
Section 145(2)(b) of the LRA provides that an award issued by the commissioner in
terms of section 138(7)(a)131may be reviewed and set aside if it is deemed, by one of
the parties, to have been improperly obtained. This sub category, is borrowed from the
Arbitration Act 42 of 1965132 and focuses on misconduct by a party whereas
misconduct in s 145(2)(a)(i)133 is limited to the conduct of the commissioner. As shall
be seen, the misconduct by the party influences the decision of the commissioner and
may in some instances result in the misconduct by the commissioner, that is, where
owing to the influence, he deliberately issues an award in favour of the said or
concerned party.
The first inescapable inquiry however relates to what is to be understood by the
phrase ' an award has been improperly obtained' as found in s 145 of the LRA. Recent
131 S 138(7)(a) provides as follows: within 14 days of the conclusion of the arbitration
proceedings -
(a) the commissioner must issue an arbitration award with brief reasons, signed by
the commissioner.
132 S 33 of the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965 is entitled 'setting aside of award.' S 33(1)© states
that where an award has been improperly obtained, the court may, on the application of any
party to the reference after due notice to the other party or parties, make an order setting the
award aside.
133 S 145(2)(a)(i) states that a defect referred to in subsection (1) means that the
commissioner committed misconduct in relation to the duties of the commissioner as an
arbitrator.
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case law has not shed light on this phrase. However, as the phrase has been borrowed
from the Arbitration Act, there is case law emanating from the same that has explored
the meaning of this phrase . For example in Bester v Easigas (Pty) Ltd and another
134
the court had the opportunity to deal with the meaning of this phrase as it appears in
the Arbitration Act and the learned Brand AJ had the following to say at 38 C - D:
Thirdly, it is obvious, in any op inion, that dishonest or blameworthy conduct
on the part of the arbitrator will not always be covered by section 33(l)(c ) of
the Arbitration Act. As I understand the Act, the problem is, broadly speaking,
that sec tion 33(l)(a/ 35 deals with improper conduct on the part of the
arbitrator whereas section 33(1)(c) contemplates misconduct on the part of
the successful party. Where the successf ul party bribes the arbitrator, the two
subsections will overlap. This overlap is of no Significance, however, in
determining the meaning ofthe two subsections.
The labour court dealt with this defect or ground in Moloi and Euijen No and
another/" The court made reference to the definition of the phrase as espoused in
the Bester case. The court further explained the overlap noted in the Bester case and
had this to say:
In my view, the latter subsection contemplates a situation where the one party
to the arbitration through fra ud or other improper means, obtains an award in
his or her f avour. This can either be in the form of a bribe or by misleading
and f alse or fra udulent representation which lead to an award being granted
in that party 's favour. It is different, in my op inion, from a charge that the
commissioner misconducted himself, although it is quite possible that the
commissioner's misconduct may give rise to the improper obtaining of an
award. For example, ifa party to an arbitration bribes the commissioner and
134 Note 45 above, 30
135 S 33(1)(a) states as follows-
(a) any member of the arbitration tribunal has misconducted himself in relation to his
duties as arbitrator or empire.
136 Note 47 above, 1372
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obtains an award in its favour, the award would have been improperly
obtained and the commissioner would also have misconducted himself.
Limited case law on this defect is testimony to the fact that it is difficult to prove that
commissioners have been bribed or influenced in one way or the other. However,
differently viewed, it is a testimony that commissioners do not engage themselves in
illicit activities that lead to the miscarriage of justice. An application for review of
awards on the basis of the aforegoing has not been successful. In the Moloi case, an
application for review and the setting aside of the award was brought before the
labour court on the strength that one of the parties remained with the commissioner in
the arbitration room while the applicant party departed. The commissioner was said to
have held a meeting with the respondent party in the absence of the applicant party
and hence, it was claimed, this influenced his award. The party was deemed to have
improperly obtained the award. In dismissing this claim, the court stated:
The question is whether each time that one party to an arbitration departs
from the venue first, knowingly leaving a commissioner and a representative
of the other party behind, gives rise to a secret meeting and taints the
commissioner with bias, impartiality and dishonest conduct. In my view it does
not.
A review application bordering on this defect was further dismissed in County Fair v
CCMA and others. 137 In this case, the applicant alleged that the award was improperly
obtained on the basis that whilst cross examining one of the witnesses, the
representative to the witness kept on indicating, by way of hand signals, when to
answer and when to keep quite. In dismissing this ground, the court noted that there
was no justification on the papers for inferring that the award had been improperly
obtained. Instead the court assumed in favour of the applicant that what it was
actually seeking to allege under this head was that the respondent had committed a
gross irregularity by failing to appreciate the circumstances in which the events he
was evaluating occurred.
137 Note 106 above, 2609
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The other aspect of this defect constitute s misleading and or giving false evidence.
The labour court was ceased with the task to determine whether or not an award was
improperly obtained on the basis that false evidence was admitted by the
commissioner. This transpired in Lekota v First National Bank of SA Ltd 138• The
applicant was dismissed for refusing to obey an instruction. The commissioner found
that the dismissal was fair. In support of his application for review, the applicant
alleged that the commissioner accepted false evidence in a manner that made him an
accessory to perjury and that he did not treat the case seriously. The court dismissed
this application, stating that there were no grounds to prove the allegation.
Finally, in Coetzee v Lebea no and another139 an application for review was based
among other things on the allegation that the commissioner entertained irrelevant and
improper considerations , and that he failed to act in a judicial and proper manner . The
labour court observed that there was not a jot of evidence to show that the
commissioner did not act judicially or that he had acted improperly. The court further
said:
To accuse the first respondent, a commissioner appointed by the commission
for conciliation, mediation and arbitration, of not applying his mind is one
thing, but to accuse him of impropriety without substantiating that accusation
borders on contempt .....It does a great disservice to our public institutions to
weigh in with unsubstantiated claims ofimpropriety.
Owing to the limited case law on this ground, it is not possible to make a good
assessment of the review function on this particular ground. It is quite possible that
the difficulty in terms of proof posed by this ground has led to a situation where
parties have sought refuge in other reviewable grounds prescribed in the LRA.
138(1998) 10 BLLR 1021 (Le)
139 Note 105 above, 129
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3.7 The award is not rationally justifiable in relation to the reasons given
for it.
The grounds for review discussed hitherto are all prescribed in s 145 of the LRA.
However, owing to the Labour Appeal Court ruling in Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus
no and another. l'" awards by commissioners have been challenged on other grounds
which continue to be the subject of major debates amongst practitioners. One such
ground is that the award must be rationally justifiable in relation to the reasons given
for it. This is intended to cater for the constitutional imperative that commiss ioners '
decisions must be justifiable in relation to the reasons given for them.141•
In the Carephone case, the Labour Appeal Court was ceased with the task to
determine whether review of commis sioners' awards should be brought before the
courts in tenus of s 145 or s l58(1)(g) of the LRA. Prior to the ruling, s 145 was
deemed to constitute narrower grounds for review whilst s 158(1)(g) was perceived to
allow for a review on far broader grounds.142 In dismissing this argument, the court
140 Note 6 above, 1425
141141 S 33 of the Constitution reads: Everyone has the right to administrative action that is
lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair. This must be read with item 23(2)(b) of the same
which reads: Every person has the right to -
(a) lawful administrative action where any of their rights or legitimate expectations is
affected or threatened;
(b) procedurally fair administrative action where any of their rights or legitimate
expectations is affected or threatened;
(c) be furnished with reasons in writing for administrative action which affects any of
their rights or interests unless the reasons for that action have been made public;
and
(d) administrative action which is justifiable in relation to the reasons given for it
where any of their rights is affected or threatened.
142 It was argued that the provisions of s 145, which provide for specified, limited grounds for
reviewing the CCMA's arbitration awards, violate the constitution. The argument has been
that the grounds specified in s 145 are narrower than those provided for by s 33(1) read with
item 23(2)(b) of the constitution - particularly in that the constitutional imperative that the
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per Froneman DJP held that the view that s 145 should be interpreted narrowly sterns
from inappropriate reliance placed on decisions interpreting a corresponding section
of the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965.143 He also stated that the effect of allowing the
review of CCMA arbitration awards in terms of s 158(1)(g) would be to render s 145
superfluous. The learned judge's finding was that s 145 is not unconstitutional and
that it must be interpreted in accordance with the constitution. Thus the constitutional
imperative that commissioner's decision ought to be rational and justifiable in relation
to the reasons given for it was held to be located within s 145 of the LRA, and in
particular s 145(2)(a)(iii). It was therefore unnecessary to resort to s 158(1)(g) to
achieve this end. The purpose of citing this ground for review is not to enter into the
debate as to whether or not the Carephon e decision was correct. At any rate the
Labour Appeal Court has already pleaded with the labour relations fraternity to bring
to an end the debate in the interest of certainty and stability.F" The intention is to
show that there is a body of case law that has been generated owing to reviews on the
basis of this gorund.
As alluded to above, the review in terms of this ground is brought about in terms of s
145 of the LRA. Usually a host of grounds are cited including the aforegoing. Such
was the case in Leisure Industries Ltd v Macgahey and others l 45 where the application
for review was made in terms of s 145(2)(ii) and (iii) of the LRA. The issue in dispute
was whether or not the respondent was an employee in terms of the LRA. If found to
be an employee, the court was to determine whether or not his dismissal was fair. The
commissioner had found that the respondent was an employee and that he had been
unfairly dismissed. After assessing the manner in which the arbitration proceedings
were conducted, the court made the following remarks:
commissioner's decision be justifiable in relation to the reasons given for it is not clearly a
ground for review in terms of s 145.
143 This is the decisions in the case of Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union v
Veldspun Lld (1994) (1) SA 162 A.
144 The LAC found this in Shoprite Checkers (PTY) Lld v Ramdaw No and others (2001) 22
ILJ 1603 (LAC)
145 (2001) 22 ILJ 2026 (LC)
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In conclusion, I should say that the alacrity with which the arbitrator disposed
of the hearing and the f act that he issued his award only two days later lend
some credence to the susp icions ofbias alluded to. In any event" I am of the
opinion that the arbitrator 's award is singularly lacking in rationality and
justifiability in the light of the totality of the evidence bef ore him(limited as it
was by the irregularities) and for this reason, too, is reviewable.
The test for review espoused in the Carephone decision was further the subject of
review in Gimini Indent Agencies cc t/a S & A Marketing v CCMA and others.
146
In
this case, the employee walked out of the disciplinary inquiry and the commissioner
found that he had foregone his right to a fair hearing. On the basis of this, the
employer brought in a review saying it was not reasonably justifiable for the
commissioner to have examined the procedural fairness of the enquiry particularly the
impartiality of the chairperson. Apart from finding that the argument was
unpersuasive, the court held as follows:
Applying the test f or review laid out in Carephone, it could not be said that
there was no reasonable objective basis to justify the connection made by the
commissioner between the material properly available to him and the
conclusion which he eventually arrived at. The evidence presented befo re the
commissioner showed a history ofevents characterised by serious antagonism
between the employee and the managing member (chairperson). In these
circumstances there was at least a rational connection between the factual
material available bef ore the commissioner and his conclusion that the
managing member was so personally involved that he could reasonably be
perceived as not being suffi ciently impartial to chair the disciplinary inquiry.
146 (1999) 20 ILJ 2872 (Le) see also Cadema (Pfy) Lt v CCMA (Westen Cape Region) and
others (2000) 21 ILJ 2261 (LC) where an employee was dismissed for insolence. In his
award , the commissioner stated that dismissal was not the appropriate sanction. In his view,
the employer should have instituted a sanct ion short of dismissal. The employer then sought
to review the award on the grounds that the commissioner's decision was not rationally
justifiable on the basis of the evidence before him. In cons idering the merits of the matter on
the limited basis permitted by Carephane, the court was unable to conclude that the decision
of the commissioner was rationally justifiable.
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It appears that even where the applicant has not raised this as a ground for review, the
courts are more than willing to test the award of commissioners on the basis of the
ground, perhaps in an effort to ensure that they are within the confines of the
constitution. For instance, in Shield Security Group (Pty) Ltd v CCMA and others l47
the grounds for review were stated as follows: that the commissioner misdirected
himself in holding that the applicant had not considered alternatives to the employee's
dismissal for operational requirements; that the commissioner had erred in law in
approaching the provisions of s 189 of the LRA as though they were peremptory; and
that the commissioner had misdirected himself by exercising the discretion that he
was required to exercise in relation to the award of compensation. It is common cause
that the applicant did not state as one of his grounds that the award was not justifiable
in relation to the reasons given for it. Perhaps this was not necessary as the legislature
did not deem it essential to have this as a separate ground for review. The ground is
perhaps all encompassing and tends to fit in all reviewable situations.
In the above case the court found that the applicant had established a good cause for
review. Thus it concluded, the decision of the commissioner was not justifiable on the
basis of the material placed before him. Similarly in Capwest Mouldings and
Components cc v Ely and others148 the court dealt with the justifiability of the award
even though this was not spelt out as one of the grounds for review. The
commissioner found that the employee was constructively dismissed and hence
awarded compensation. The court however found that the commissioner failed to
apply the two-stage test that deals with a dispute involving an alleged constructive
dismissal set out in Sappi Kraft (Pty) Ltd tla Tugela Mill v Majake no and others.149
According to the test, the employee discharges the onus that he was constructively
dismissed. Once he has been successful, then the employer justifies why the dismissal
was fair. As a result of this omission by the commissioner, the court was of the view
that the evidence before the commissioner did not reasonably justify his finding that
the employee was constructively dismissed.
147 (2000) 21 ILJ 958 (LC)
148 (1999) 20 ILJ 2859 (LC)
149 (1998) 19 ILJ 1240 (LC)
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150 1" C •Lastly in Vita Foam SA (Pty) Ltd v CCMA and others an app ication ror review was
brought before the labour court on the basis of s 145. The employer alleged that the
commissioner erred in finding that the dismissal of five employees for misconduct
during a protected strike was both substantively and procedurally unfair. The
employees were seen either holding or leaning against the gate and thus impeding
entrance or departure through the gate. Despite the fact that evidence was led to this
effect, the commissioner nevertheless found that the dismissal was substantively
unfair. To this the court held that the decision of the commissioner was not justifiable
in relation to the evidence adduced and hence set aside the award.
As it has been the case in other reviewable circumstances, the court has in a number
of decisions replaced the decisions of the commissioners with its own on the basis that
the decisions were not rationally justifiable in terms of the reasons given for them. In
the cases to be stated shortly, the court did not motivate any reasons as to why it chose
to replace the decision rather than remitting the matters to the CCMA. In the
Leisure l 51case, the court found that the respondent was not an employee in terms of
the LRA and hence ruled that he was not dismissed. This was perhaps in order in that
once he was not an employee then that put to the end the enquiry regarding his
dismissal. However in the shield decision, the matter was not so conclusive. Here the
commissioner found that the retrenchment of the employee was both substantively
and procedurally unfair and awarded compensation as a result. After perusing the
merits of the case, the court was of the view that the commissioner's award was not
justifiable and hence replaced the award with a ruling that read; the dismissal of the
applicant is determined to have been both substantively and procedurally fair.
The above and other similar scenarios noted elsewhere make the role of the court
quite a confusing issue especially if one has regards to the distinction between a
review and an appeal. In its attempt to maintain a distinction between the aforegoing
concepts, the Labour Appeal Court in Carephone emphasised that although there may
be a need to consider the merits of the case, that will be in order as long as the judge
determining the issue is aware that he or she enters the merits not in order to substitute
150 (2000) 21 ILJ 244 (Le)
151
Note 145 above, 2026
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his or her own opinion on the correctness thereof, but rather to find out whether the
outcome is rationally justifiable. It seems to me that once that has been achieved, then
that should constitute the end of the enquiry.
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Chapter Four
4.1 Evaluation of the review function
The assessment and evaluation of the review function should not only be done against
the back drop of what it was intended to achieve when the new dispensation was
ushered in but further against what it has achieved so far in terms of guiding the
arbitration function through its reviews. One of the key objectives of the current
labour dispensation is the effective and speedy resolution of disputes in order to
promote the peaceful existence of labour and capital in the industrial relations
arena 152. The LRA is further intended to bring justice more closely to the parties and
hence instil the confidence eroded in the past system due to delays exacerbated by
prolonged litigation.
To eliminate the litigious nature of the past system, award s by commissioners are
final and binding. However, aggrieved parties may take the awards on review strictly
on the basis of the grounds prescribed in s 145 of the LRA. This therefore means that
parties do not have the right of appeal as was the case in the past. The aforeging was
done with the hope. that the system will be less litigious. A review as opposed to
appeal, especially where grounds are prescribed, reduces the possibilities of matters
being taken on review and hence dragging forever. Thus less reviews were expected.
However, contrary to the above expectation, a relatively large number of cases find
their way to the review function. Whilst some analysts in this field find this as a
reflection of the inadequacy in the performance of the CCMA , something that may be
too harsh a criticism, others regard it as a normal phenomenon in a system where
arbitration is compulsory. Others are even of the opinion that a review in these
circumstances is not sufficient. ls3 It can however be said that the CCMA as an
152 Section 1 of the LRA states: The purpose of this Act is to advance economic development,
social justice, labour peace and the democratisation of the workplace by fulfilling the primary
objects of this Act, which are amongst others the effective resolution of labour disputes.
153 N Whitear-Nel 'Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus No and others (1998) 19 ILJ 1425 (LAC)'
(1999) 20 ll.J 1483 where states as follows at page 1488-1489 'It is my submission that it
would be preferable, in the interest of clarity and certainty, for the legislature to intervene and
to provide for a mechanism for appeal against compulsory arbitration awards. In order to
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institution that has recently emerged in the new democracy was alway s destined to
encounter hiccups in its early stages of operation. It is quite possible that some of the
motivations for reviews can be traced to the inadequacies or problems that are faced
by the organisation. Amongst the failures or problems observed by John Brand
154
are
shortage of financial and human resources, enormous case load, delay in the
resolution of disputes , poor quality of arbitration awards, inadequate training leading
to incompetence in commissioners.
According to Brand,t55 in the period November 1996 to April 1999, the CCMA
received 175 046 cases averaging 323 cases every working day. This case load
exceeded the case load budgeted for by 37.5% yet the funds budgeted for only
increased by 6.6%. This shortfall in funding had far reaching effects. For instance, the
scarcity of the resources caused commissioners to rece ive only very basic training.
Those with limited legal qualifi cation and experience were initially not supposed to
arbitrate .156 However due to enormous case load leading to backlog, least experienced
and qualifi ed commissioners had to arbitrate leading to poor quality of awards. Thus
this lack of resources obviously impacted on the CCMA's capacity to deliver the
effective, expeditious and quality services expected of it.15? It is on the basis of the
aforegoing shortcomings that the advocacy for the right of appeal has always been
based.158
prevent this from hampering the effective resolution of labour disputes, it may be necessary to
consider limiting the right of appeal to issues involving complex question of law.
154 J . Brand 'CCMA: Achievements and challenges - Lessons from the first three years'




158 Ibid, 90 where John Brand states : It is perfectly in order for the parties to be deprived of a
right of appeal when they deliberately and voluntari ly contract out of formal litigation and
choose private arbitration . Then they choose the arbitrator and agree to be finally bound by
his or her decision . It is totally different when one party forces another into a process and they
have an adjudicator imposed on them. In such a situation the dictates of fairness and
legitimacy indicate that an adverse of fairness and legitimacy indicate that an adverse finding
should be able to be challenged.
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The labour courts are entrusted with the review function and do the same in the light
of all inadequacies stated above. It must however be said that all is not dark and
gloomy in the CCMA. There are quality awards that continue to emerge out of this
institution due to qualified and experienced commissioners as well as the guidance
that has been provided by the labour courts overtime. Thus the review function should
not only be viewed in the light of the shortcomings of the CCMA but also in terms of
its positive results in the form of well reasoned awards. At any rate, inadequacies or
not, the labour court has no jurisdiction to treat a matter as if they were dealing with
an appeal. The very courts have emphasised from time to time that the distinction
between review and appeal should be maintained at all costS.1 59 However, whether or
not they have lived up to this expectation remains debatable as shall be seen shortly.
One of the key tasks of the labour courts is to create stability and certainty in as far as
the labour jurisprudence is concerned. It has long been a principle of our law that the
law must be seen as certain, to enable the average citizen to know, at any given time,
what the law is and what his or her rights and obligations are .160 Thus conflicting
decisions emerging both from the Labour Appeal Court and the Labour Courts does
not only cause confusion within the CCMA ranks but also in the industrial relations
fraternity as to the state of our law. The lack of certainty is likely to lead to a fertile
ground for litigation resulting in the prolonged resolution of disputes, a situation that
is contrary to the objects of the LRA. It would appear that conflicting decisions have
become an accepted norm within our labour jurisprudence much to the discomfort of
159 Note 6 above, 1425 where Froneman DJP stated: 'One must be careful not to extend the
scope of review for the wrong reasons. One such wrong reason would be the fact that the
Labour Court has no original or appeal jurisdiction in respect of the matters to be conciliated
and arbitrated under the auspices of the commission and to compensate for this by an
extended review.' See also Coetzee v Lebea No and another (1999) 20 tU 129 (Le) where
Cheadle AJ said the followinq: 'Accordingly, once a reviewing court is satisfied that the
tribunal has applied its mind, it will not interfere with the result even if it would have come to a
different conclusion . The best demonstration of applying ones mind is whether the outcome
can be sustained by the facts found and the law applied . The emphasis is on the range of
reasonable outcomes not on the correct one.
160 N. Van Dokkum 'The issuing of 7.12 Certificates and the jurisdiction of the CCMA' (2001)
22 tU 1492
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many practitioners. As observed by Hutchinson161 'the methodology of expressing
reservations which fall short of overruling previous authorities is all too familiar.
Unfortunately, it leads to much uncertainty which is something that a court ofappeal
should eschew. If anything the Labour Appeal Court should be charting the way
forward by plotting a steady course.'
One such area of law where the courts created a lot of uncertainty was with regards to
the appropriate standard for reviewing awards emerging from the CCMA. The initial
controversy was with regards to the appropriate provision in the LRA in terms of
which reviews should be brought before the labour courts. The LRA provisions,
discussed at length in the first chapter, are section 145 and 158(1)(g). Those who
favoured a wide review test argued in favour of the latter section whilst those who
preferred a strict review test tended to be in favour of the former section. The matter
finally came before the Labour Appeal Court (LAC) in the important decision of the
Carephone'i' decision where it was decided that the appropriate section for reviewing
awards was section 145 of the LRA and not section l58(1)(g).
The test established in the above dictum was that the awards of the commissioners
should be justifiable in terms of the reasons given for it. Unfortunately the
controversy failed to dissipate. In Toyota SA Motors (Pty) Ltd v Radebe and others 163
a differently constituted LAC expressed doubts as to the correctness of the approach
adopted in the Carephone decision although it did not expressly overturn it. The
controversy was heightened when Wallis AJ entered into the fray with his decision in
Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Ramdaw No and others. 164 In a lengthy and well argued
decision, he came to the conclusion that the Carephone decision did not constitute
161 W . Hutchinson 'Is the Labour Appeal Court succeeding in its endeavours to create
certainty in our jur isprudence' (2001) 22 ILJ 2223 See also the remarks by N Van Dokkum
(see 9 above, 1492) where he says 'if the fabled alien visitor were to land in our country today
and attempt to understand the state of our labour law by reading the various judgements of
our labour courts, it would quickly rocket back to Mars with its tails between its legs. Different
judges say different things, usually as pronouncements of policy disguised as purposive
interpretation, and this leading to great uncertainty.'
162 Note 6 above, 1425
163 Note 36 above, 340
1M(2000)21 ILJ 1232 (LC)
62
good law . The decision was taken on appeal and the LAC, in a lengthy decision too,
addressed the issue of the appropriate review test in detail and came to the conclusion
that the Carephon e decision and the test formulated therein still applied. The court did
accept some of the criticisms levelled against the Carephone decision but nevertheless
decided that the decision should be left unperturbed in the interest of certainty and
bili . he law i h· 165sta I ity m t e a m t IS area.
While the above confusion did not impact so much on the way the commissioners go
about conducting their matters, in that it concerned itself with how awards are to be
brought before the courts, it certainly had an impact in the rest of the industrial
relations community which makes use of the CCMA and the labour courts in the
resolution of their disputes.
Another area of the law that has been a subject of several contravening decisions from
the courts relates to the defective applications to the CCMA. Defective applications
arise when one party, usually the respondent, alleges that the matter is not properly
before the CCMA because the referral form was not properly completed. The usual
course of events when an employee declares a dispute with his or her employer, more
often than not concerning an allegation of unfair dismissal, is that the employee will
approach the CCMA and make an application on form 7.11 alleging the unfair
dismissal, briefly stating the background to the dismissal, and applying for the
establishment of a conciliation hearing. 166 Thereafter, a conciliation hearing is held,
and if the dispute is unresolved, the conciliating commissioner will issue a form 7.12
certificate to effect that the matter remains unresolved. Once this has been done, the
dispute can be referred to the CCMA for arbitration, if it has the jurisdiction to hear
the case . If the matter comes before the CCMA, an award is handed out at the end of
the arbitration proceedings.
165 The LAC as per Zondo JP concluded; 'The carephone debate has been going on for a
long time. Nevertheless the labour relations commun ity has for sometime now organised its
lines and activities on the bais of that judgement of this court. I accept that some of the
criticism against carephone is justified but, having regard to all the circumstances and in order
to bring about certainty and stability in the law in this area, I think the debate must come to an
end.
166 See 161 above, 1492
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Very often the respondent party waits until the appli cant party attempts to make the
award an order of court . It is then that it challenges the award on the grounds that the
dispute was not properly before the CCMA as the form of referral was not properly
completed, and as such the subsequent proceedings at the CCMA, including the
arbi tration hand ed down, were void ab initio. The defect on the appli cation form was
usually on the basis that the form was not completed and filed by the applicant
employee in his personal capacity, a requirement that was said to flow from s 191(1)
of the LRA. 167 It was this interpretation of the law that saw many contradictory
rulings emerging out of our courts much to the confusion of the applicants,
practitioners and CCMA commissioners alike. The issue was whether or not the form
could be signed and filed on behalf of the applicant employee(s). The initial rulings
from the labour courts were that the dismissed employees could be assisted in
referring the dispute to the CCMA as long as the assisting party did not sign the
referral form .168 The courts interpreted the above section to mean no other person
other than the employee could sign the forms.169
The above interpretati on of section 191(1) of the LRA came under tremendous
criti cism in subsequent decisions of the same court. It was attacked for being over-
technical and not in congruence with the objects of the LRA. 170 For instanc e, in the
case ofPasmans v ABC Telesales,171 Soni AJ made the following observations:
In my view, the Rustenburg Platinum Mines case is clearly distinguishable.
True enough, s 191 states that a dismissed employee may ref er the dispute f or
conciliation. But this must be read together with ss 161 and 138(4) of the Act,
which set out the class of persons who may represent p arties in labour
disputes. So long as the person who signs the form is one ofsuch a class and
167 s 191(1) states that if there is a dispute about the fairness of a dismissal, the dismissed
employee may refer the dispute in writing within 30 days of the date of dismissal.
168 Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd (Rustenburg section) v CCMA and others (1998) 19 IU
327 (LC)
169 Ibid, 327
170 See for example the judgement of Etschmaier v CCMA (1999) 20lU 144 (LC) 150C
171 (2001) 22 ILJ 624 (LC)
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is duly authorised, in my view there can be no challenge to the validity of the
referral.
To rule otherwise would make a mockery ofthe role ofunion officials in cases
ofmass dismissals for example. In my view, a referral is a juristic act. It can
be performed by a duly authorised agent. Section 138(4) and (6) enumerates
who those agents are. So long as a referral is made by such an agent, it is
proper and the CCMA or a bargaining council, as the case may be, and the
other party are obliged to consider it as if made by the party himself or
herself.
Owing to decisions such as the above, certainty as to who is authorised to sign the
referral forms was restored in this area of the law.
Whereas various areas of the law have been the subject of contradicting decisions
from the courts and thus causing uncertainty in the arbitration function, it is perhaps
in the actual reviewing process where the failure to make a distinction between a
review and an appeal has caused anxiety both in the CCMA and the industrial
relations community at large. As observed elsewhere in this work, maintaining this
distinction has not been quite an easy task. The occasional blurring of the difference
between these concepts has great implications for the CCMA in the sense that it
makes a difference between an award being set aside and the same being allowed to
stand. Every time an award is not set aside, that constitutes a plus to the CCMA and
hence bolters the confidence of the industrial relations community on the institution.
However a success in review on the other hand, especially in circumstances where the
courts appear to have abondened its review function in favour of appeal, constitutes a
draw back in the system in that it encourages the litigious elements in our society to
persevere with the hope that an alternative decision may be secured in the courts. This
indeed undermines the integrity of the CCMA. The normal course of events is that
parties should learn to live with the decisions of the CCMA as long as they are
rational and justifiable. The temptation to occasionally stretch the review to a point
where it almost amounts to an appeal can be traced to the general feeling of the
lawyers in this field. A quick review of the articles generated by the same suggest that
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they are in favour of appeal and would thus do everything in their capabilities to
. hi d' . 172influence the courts III t IS irection.
It is common knowledge by now that over and above the grounds of review
prescribed by section 145 of the LRA, the courts have adopted the justifiability test in
their review of the CCMA awards. The test states that the decisions by the
commissioners should be justifiable in relation to the reasons given for them. It is
further the carephone approach that judges may enter the merits of the dispute in their
review function as long as they do so not in order to substitute their opinions on the
correctness thereof but to determine whether the outcome is rationally justifiable. An
expression on the correctness is deemed to amount to an appeal. There are several
instances where the courts have not lived up to this test. For example, in Adcock
ingram critical care v CCMA and others, 173 the respondent employee was a member
of the union negotiation committee negotiating with the management during a bloody
and acrimonious strike involving death, assaults and petrol bombing. He was reported
to have said to management: 'You can treat this as a threat - there will be more blood
on your hands. He was charged with and found guilty of intimidation. The dispute
was referred to the CCMA and an arbitrator found that the words were uttered within
a privileged environment at the negotiating table behind closed doors. He further
found among other things that the threat was an empty one as it was not directed to
any particular individual and hence concluded that the dismissal was substantively
unfair.
The matter was taken on review and the labour court dismissed the application on the
grounds that the commissioner had properly applied his mind to the matter and had
not committed any irregularity which tainted his award. It was held that the statement
did not amount to a threat. Further more, even if the statement was intimidatory, so
said the labour court, it was made in a representative capacity and within the
privileged environment at the negotiation table and that it would therefore be grossly
unfair to single out the employee for individual disciplinary action and to dismiss him
for it. The matter was taken on appeal, and the labour appeal court was of the view
172
See 153 above, 1488. See also 154 above, 90
173 (2001) 22 ILJ 1799 (LAC)
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that the court a quo's approach amounted to 'anything goes approach.' The court
accepted that an employee playing the role of a negotiator enjoys a greater leeway
than normal. By so doing it conceded the fact that the negotiation environment is
privileged. It however observed that it is wrong to suggest that such employee has
free rein to do or say whatever they want. The court did not go as far as to determine
what constitutes acceptable conduct in a negotiation environment. It was however of
the view that the words uttered by the employee amounted to unacceptable conduct. It
was on the basis of the aforegoing that the court submitted that its view of the matter
greatly differed with that of the lower court and hence warranted inteference. It is
submitted that this is a typical example of a situation where the court simply
substituted its opinion for that of the lower court. Its argument vis-a-vis that of the
commissioner and the lower court is not convincing. Further more, it was not shown
how the two markedly differed. It seems the court was preoccupied with the
correctness of the award as opposed to whether or not it was rationally justifiable
under the circumstances.
Another example where the court seemed to go beyond its review function is to be
seen in Solomon v CCMA and others174 where an employee referred a dispute to the
CCMA about his failure to receive a promotion. The employee further claimed that
the successful candidate was not qualified for the position and that he was better
qualified and should have occupied the position. At the hearing, the commissioner
narrowed the issues with the parties' consent to the question whether the successful
candidate was qualified and his appointment in keeping with the Public Service Act.
The commissioner dismissed the application on the basis that the applicant did not
qualify for the position. He further found that it was unfair to appoint the successful
candidate. Even though the court was of the view that the outcome of the case was
correct, it set aside the award on the strength that the reasoning leading to the same
was not logical or consequential. In other words, the reasoning was faulty. It has been
observed in various decisions175 that the fact that the reasoning is faulty should not in
itself be the ground for interference with an award. However in this case, the court
justified its decision to interfere by stating as follows:
174 (1999) 20 ILJ 2960 (Le)
175 Ibid, 1802
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The review process is designed to ensure that certain fundamental values are
upheld, that 'due process' is followed in regard to administrative action, in
this instance being arbitration proceedings under the auspices ofthe CCMA. I
am satisfied that these values were not upheld and that 'due process' did not
occur when this matter was dealt with by the second respondent. To allow the
award to stand in the circumstances would set an undesirable precedent and
would send a wrong message to CCMA commissioners, in the effect, that it
does not matter how you reach the result as long as the result is correct.
It is difficult to imagine situations where the court will find the reasoning faulty and
allow the award to stand, for in the cases that one has come across, the court has
always found justification for interfering with an award. Thus contrary to Sharpe' s176
views, a correct award is equally vulnerable to being set aside by the courts.
Lastly, a focus on the correctness of the merits is discernable in the decisions of the
labour appeal court in Miladys (a division of Mr Price group Ltd) v Naidoo and
others l 77 and Chemical Energy Paper Printing Wood and Allied Workers Union
(CEPPWAWUj and Another v Class and Alluminium 2000 CC178 where the court
dealt with a dispute relating to constructive dismissal. The two decisions, delivered by
Nicholson JA on behalf of the other two judges, are a clear testimony of how the line
between a review and an appeal may suddenly disappear. Reading through the
decisions, one can not help the feeling that the court interfered unnecessarily. In both
disputes, employees brought cases of constructive dismissals against their employers.
In the Miladys decision, the CCMA and the labour court found in favour of the
employee. Without setting out the test for constructive dismissal as was done in
Pretoria Society for the Care ofthe Retarded v Loots 179 the court went on to find that
the award was reviewable on the ground that the commissioner did not apply his mind
176 C.W. Sharpe 'Reviewing CCMA Arbitration Awards: Towards clarity in the labour courts'
(2000) 21 tU at 2168 where he stated: 'where judges under the guise of justifiability are
effectively reviewing the merits for correctness, the commissioner's only chance of preserving
an award on review is by reaching the right decision - not simply a justifiable one.'
177 (2002) 23 ILJ 1234 (LAC)
178 (2002) 23 ILJ 695 (LAC)
179 (1997) 181LJ (LAC) 985
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seriously to the issues at hand and reason his way to the conclusion by disbelieving
the respondent on a ground that was inconsequential. It was the court's view that once
the employee had resigned, it regretted the step and tried to concoct a case of
constructive dismissal. The same was not said of an employee who resigned and
reported to work the following day. The aforegoing events transpired in the
CEPPWAWU and another decision where the court, unlike in the previous decision,
was not only sympathetic to the course of the employee but was prepared to go an
extra mile in showing a case of constructive dismissal where none actually existed. In
this case, the employee alleged that he was dismissed and on the alternative that he
was constructively dismissed. The employee failed to discharge the onus that there
was direct dismissal and hence the court moved on to the alternative allegation; being
that he was constructively dismissed. In finding that the employee was constructively
dismissed, the court made the following observations:
If the second appellant did resign, which is not entirely clear, he did so in the
heat of the moment and as such on the above authorities should not be held
effective. That he returned the next day to get his employment back is
indicative that he had made such a decision as a result of the circumstances
under which he was acting at the time. It was common cause in the case that a
fracas did occur in the Williams's office and that the second appellant
(employee) was engaged in a duty which he was required to carry out as a
shop steward. The probabilities favour that his treatment at this fracas made
him despair ofcontinuing in employment with respondent.
It must be said that the events in these cases are strikingly similar in that prior to the
resignations a fracas occurred. However, whereas the decision to resign at the heat of
the moment cost the employee her job in the first case, this was not the case in the
second decision where the court manufactured a convenient justification for the same.
The court was more than willing to invoke the standard of probabilities in finding in
the employee's favour. Surely with this unconvincing standard of reasoning, it is not
suprising that the court did not openly state that the commissioner failed to apply his
mind or that his decision was not justifiable in relation to the material before him for
the same cannot be said about the decision of the labour appeal court. All that it did
was to impose its opinion which is contrary to the justifiability test. This thus
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becomes a classic example of a situation where the court overstepped its boundaries.
This contrasting state of affairs leaves one with the feeling that the labour appeal court
at times goes to great length in tempering with decisions that ought to have been left
alone.
Whereas judges have, on many occasions, been faithful to the distinction in
carephone between 'j ustifiability ' and 'correctness,' and the admonition that the
judge should enter the merits not in order to substitute his or her own opinion on the
correctness thereof, but determine whether the outcome is justifiable, there are
instances such as the ones sighted above which give an indication that the distinction,
at least in the South African context, will for a while remain academic . It is this
failure to respect the distinction that will make the system of our dispute resolution




At the outset of this paper, several questions were asked and investigations were
conducted to get answers to the same. The questions were such as; on what grounds
may the CCMA awards be reviewed?; whether or not the principles of review have
been adhered to by the labour courts? Whether or not the courts have provided
consistency and guidance in its jurisprudence? And finally whether or not the
activities of the arbitration and adjudication functions have contributed positively
towards the attainment of the key objectives of the LRA, one of which is the speedy
and effective resolution of labour disputes.
There is no doubt that awards by commissioners are reviewable in terms of the
grounds prescribed in section 145 of the LRA. It was further revealed that awards
should be justifiable in relation to the reasons advanced by commissioners. This test,
which emanated from the Carephone decision, also emphasised the need for the
protection of the principles of review. In this regard, it was stated that judges should
enter the merits of the case not in order to establish their correctness, but rather to do
in order to establish the justifiability of the award. It is quite evident from the
discussion that judges have not always been successful in maintaining the distinction
between review and appeal. This has been discernable from the way they have failed
to adhere to the test stated above. It is quite clear, from a couple of decisions that
judges have strayed from this test and hence fallen pray to the dictates of appeal. This
is obviously an undesirable development especially if one has regards to the
shortcomings of the past system. The past system was overly criticised for being
extremely litigious as a result of the existence of the right of appeal. The tendency to
drift into appeal has the potential to throw the present system into problems
experienced in the past system. Once lawyers get the feeling, owing to the decisions
of the courts, that they can always salvage a different decision as a result of their
persistence, then the system will become litigious once more and unachievable will be
the objective that disputes should be resolved speedily and effectively.
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Some analysts have welcomed the overly broader approach the courts have adopted in
its review function. In justifying the same, the compulsory nature of arbitration has
always come handy. And so has been the shortcomings of the CCMA in as far as
delivering quality awards is concerned. There is no doubt that the CCMA has made its
service as accessible, simple, expeditious and competent as its resources permit. The
same however cannot be confidently said about its capacity, which has been affected
right from the onset by limited financial resources. This has resulted in less manpower
and very limited training in the light of increased caseload. These constraints however
cannot be a justification for letting appeals through the back door. Besides, the
standard of awards delivered by the commissioners is generally high and continues to
improve over time. It is submitted that a review is therefore sufficient to deal with
grieviances emanating from the arbitration function.
It has further been the observation of this study that the courts have struggled to
maintain consistency in their jurisprudence. Admittedly these are courts of equity, and
can perhaps be excused when for viewing facts differently from time to time owing to
the standard of test employed. But one cannot pardon them when the inconsistency
goes as far as the interpretation of the labour statutes. This has had the effect of
creating confusion and uncertainty in the CCMA and the labour law fraternity where
issues such as condonation, jurisdiction, representation and others are grappled daily
and hence require decisive judgements. There is no doubt that the courts should
improve their performance in this area so that the overall objective of speedy and
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